The abolition of extended nuclear deterrence in Northeast Asia

Abstract

This article critically assesses the future of policies of extended nuclear deterrence in Northeast Asia. The article questions the relevance of Cold War nuclear deterrence policies in the post‐Cold War world, focusing on the obsolescence of past theoretical and historical justifications of such policies given fundamental changes in both actual nuclear force deployments and general political conditions. The operating premise of the article is that extended nuclear deterrence in Northeast Asia is already eroding, in fact if not in policy, insofar as changing force structures and political conditions have worked to undermine the credibility of extended deterrent threats. The article considers present security circumstances in light of the actual status of the policy of extended nuclear deterrence, and assesses the potential security implications of explicitly revoking such policies. The article concludes that such a policy shift could serve greatly to reduce incentives for proliferation in the region as well as promote efforts toward counter‐proliferation and nuclear weapons abolition globally.