Thailand's New Course

Abstract

THERE IS A NEW flexibility Thai politics, both external and internal. The reason for this is clearly to bring Thailand more into line with changing conditions. The previous policy suited its times, at least from the point of view of a military-dominated, security-conscious, conservatively-inclined regime. There was then a community of interest between Thai governments headed by Field Marshals Phibun Songkram (i948-57), Sarit Thanarat (i958-63), and Thanom Kittikachorn (from i963) and successive United States administrations, whether Republican or Democratic. This was reflected U.S. commitments: mutual security (military and economic aid) 1950; Seato membership 1954; and the Dean Rusk-Thanat Khoman joint statement i962 of the U.S. obligation to help Thailand, regardless of the attitude of other Seato members, in case of Communist armed attack. The Thai-American was extended to the full by President Johnson's massive intervention Vietnam. It was shown by American use of Thai bases, at first not openly acknowledged by the Thais, to bomb North Vietnam and Communist-held areas of Laos. (The previous extreme of Thai commitment had been Phibun's war-time collaboration with the Japanese, admittedly as a result of force majeure; this alliance collapsed 1944, Phibun's downfall coinciding with Japan's decline.) Thus Johnson's dramatic reversal of his Vietnam policy i968-from the confident expectation of military success, revealed General Westmoreland's Four Phase plan, to the acceptance of peace talks with the enemy'-presented the Thai leaders with an entirely new situation. First, over the next few years the Thais face the prospects of United States disengagement from Vietnam and perhaps from mainland Southeast Asia. The current de-escalation of the Vietnam war cannot make sense unless it is seen as part of a policy of withdrawal (the alternative, resuming bombing the North and sending thousands more soldiers to bolster the South, is no longer feasible). Yet President Nixon has no more than two or three years which to carry out a substantial military disengagement-presumably as a result of a settlement of sorts-if he is to make a good showing at the next presidential elections. Next, there is the possibility of instability Vietnam.