Thailand After the Coup

Abstract

Scott Christensen is a research associate at the Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI) in Bangkok. A doctoral candidate in political science at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, he is completing his doctoral dissertation on State and Society in Thailand: Policymaking and the Politics of Economic Transformation, 1973-1991. Portions of this article are based on a larger study of Thai democracy supported by TDRI. Few expected that tensions between the armed forces and the civilian cabinet of Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhaven would lead to a military coup on 23 February 1991 and the fall of Thailand's first elected prime minister since 1976. The event suggests that despite the increasing presence of many preconditions for democracy--a dynamic economy, widespread political pluralism, literacy, and a more open society--Thailand has not been able to put a permanent end to authoritarian rule. The struggle for power between men in uniform and civilian politicians continues to play a major role in Thai politics. Although elites accept the principle of popular sovereignty, they differ among themselves on how best to distribute power equitably. The February coup reflects two distinguishing features that have shaped Thai democracy. The first is the relatively recent formation and consolidation of the Thai state. After the revolt against the hereditary monarchy in 1932, generals and the civil service ruled over and above any formal state institutions. Recently, however, state structures have been institutionalized, while the old elite has been challenged by professional politicians and public interest groups. Political competition has created an intense power struggle among these elites, new and old, for control of the infrastructure of the Thai state. ~ The second feature involves the ways in which agents of political change build coalitions among themselves and bargain with the old ruling elite. 2 Thai political parties have concentrated mostly on undermining and