Technology Company Merger and Acquisition: a Study of Indonesian and European Union Competition Law

European Union (EU) competition law aimed at comple(men)ting the Internal Market rules. National competition rules of Member States undoubtedly generate similar effects at the national level. The same is true for third countries' competition rules. Yet, when turning to the impact EU competition law may/can have on the full effect of national competition rules, it is clear that both types of national rules are differently affected. In this chapter, the internal/national dimension of EU competition law specifically refers to the related yet distinct issue of the implications of EU competition law for national authorities and/or courts applying national competition rules to a concrete case. EU competition law applies to behaviour with an adverse effect on competition in the common/internal market or a substantial part thereof and on trade between Member States. Keywords: European Union (EU) competition law; Internal Market rules; Member States

The European Union(EU) is more than a common market and an economic union. Nevertheless, implementing the internal market is still one of the core goals of the EU. It aims to accomplish a highly competitive social market economy, protected against distortion of and interference with competition. The European competition law has gained increasing influence over the past years. One reason is the changed system of enforcement which gives national competition authorities and courts more competences to interpret and enforce European competition law. Another reason in the constant nominal thresholds which separate the scope of European and national competition law. Due to inflation and market concentration they are de-facto decreasing in the course of time. Furthermore, European cartel and merger control has to be observed not only by European companies but by any undertaking worldwide having small but not negligible turnover in the European Union. This has been illustrated by the take-over of the Californian computer producer AST Research by Samsung. Samsung marketed only marginal quantities in the EU and AST had a European market share of only 2.5% at that time. The companies failed to file a merger notification with the Commission. Though the Commission imposed comparatively small fines in that case, companies should be aware of higher fines in the future as the Commission might take the Samsung/AST case as precedent and might presume a greater awareness of European competition law.

Private enforcement has long been a central part of US antitrust law experience, while it has played minor roles or none at all in European competition law systems. This contrast is fundamental to understanding differences between European and US competition law and to assessing the potential consequences of increasing the role of private enforcement of competition law in Europe. It is also central to decisions about competition law development in much of the world, because in this respect most competition law systems in the world resemble European competition laws rather than US antitrust law.In this essay, I examine the private enforcement of competition law in the US and Europe against the backdrop of efforts in Europe to rely more heavily on private enforcement in the enforcement of its competition law. As part of its so-called ‘modernization’ efforts, which went into effect on May 1, 2004, the European Commission seeks to reduce reliance on administrative authorities and to encourage those harmed by restraints on competition to bring private law suits in national courts. There is, however, widespread uncertainty about the prospects for successfully incorporating private litigation into European competition law systems. There is also uncertainty about which, if any, measures should be taken to enhance acceptance of private enforcement.This article provides a comparative perspective on these issues that can provide a more solid basis for making informed decisions in the area.

The lively debate about the right of gig workers to bargain collectively stems from the idea that European Union (EU) competition law treats this group of workers worse than it treats employees. Namely, it is common to argue that employees, unlike gig workers, are permitted to conclude collective agreements because they are not undertakings and, therefore, not subject to EU competition law. In sharp contrast, by analysing the EU notion of undertaking, this article demonstrates—and this is the first of its theses—that in the labour market, which is the market that should matter in relation to the effects of collective agreements, employees are as much undertakings as any other worker, such as gig workers or other self-employed workers. The article further maintains that the reason employees are currently allowed to bargain collectively, while other workers are not, is to be found not within competition law, but outside it. At present, employees’ collective agreements are exempt from the application of EU competition law because employees enjoy the right to bargain collectively, among other social rights, and because the Court of Justice of the European Union has (rightly) recognized that the protection of these rights must trump the protection of competition. Consequently, this article argues, as its second thesis, that if Articles 151–161 TFEU were interpreted so as to grant social rights to workers other than employees, the collective agreements of gig workers and other under-protected self-employed workers would be exempt from EU competition law, as are those of employees. At the same time, however, this paper recognizes that, in the absence of such an interpretative turn, antitrust legislators and policy makers could aid gig workers and other under-protected self-employed workers by excluding them and their collective agreements from the scope of application of competition law. This—and here is the third thesis of the article—would not force the interpretation of antitrust notions and rules and would thus not require antitrust authorities and courts to use competition law to pursue goals different from the protection of efficiency and innovation.

Conceptualizing Big Tech As ‘Modern Bigness’ and Its Implications for European Competition Law Submission in Reaction to the Call for Contributions – Shaping Competition Policy in the Era of Digitalization

European competition law has influenced many national competition law systems. One of them is Greek competition law, which is already 23 years old. The development of the Greek competition law system is quite distinctive. This article gives an overview of Greek competition law by stressing the influence of European competition law upon it.

This chapter provides a brief overview of EU and UK competition law and the institutions involved in formulating, interpreting and applying competition law in those jurisdictions. It also explains the relationship between EU competition law and the domestic competition laws of the Member States, in particular in the light of Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003. The rules of the European Economic Area are briefly referred to, and the trend on the part of Member States to adopt domestic competition rules modelled on those in the EU is also noted. Three diagrams at the end of the chapter explain the institutional structure of EU and UK competition law.

This chapter provides a brief overview of EU and UK competition law and the institutions involved in formulating, interpreting and applying competition law. It also explains the relationship between EU competition law and the domestic competition laws of the Member States, in particular in the light of Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003. The rules of the European Economic Area are briefly referred to, and the trend on the part of Member States to adopt domestic competition rules modelled on those in the EU is also noted. Three diagrams at the end of the chapter explain the institutional structure of EU and UK competition law.

This chapter provides a brief overview of EU and UK competition law and the institutions involved in formulating, interpreting and applying competition law in those jurisdictions. It also explains the relationship between EU competition law and the domestic competition laws of the Member States, in particular in the light of Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003. The rules of the European Economic Area are briefly referred to, and the trend on the part of Member States to adopt domestic competition rules modelled on those in the EU is also noted. Three diagrams at the end of the chapter explain the institutional structure of EU and UK competition law.

This chapter provides an overview of the institutional actors, design and history of the competition law systems in the European Union and the UK. It begins with a discussion of the legal framework, focusing on the main competition law provisions in the EU and UK. The role of EU competition law provisions within the EU treaties is considered, along with provisions applying to all undertakings such as antitrust and merger control, application of Articles 101-102 TFEU to state conduct, the INNO doctrine, and UK laws such as Competition Act 1998. The chapter also looks at the main actors in the EU competition law process, including the European Commission and national competition authorities, and the main actors in the UK competition law process such as the Competition and Markets Authority. Finally, the history of competition law as well as the interaction between EU competition law and UK competition law are analysed.

Chapter 1 - Introduction to Competition Law 1.1 The economic background to competition law 1.2 The function of competition law 1.3 The market 1.4 Competition law and the economic theory of regulation 1.5 Various systems of competition law Literature Chapter 2 - The basic structure of competition law 2.1 Some key concepts in the application of competition law 2.2 The combined system of UK and European competition law 2.3 The scope of application of competition law Chapter 3 - The prohibition of anti-competitive agreements 3.1 Introduction 3.2 The prohibition of cartels 3.3 Voidness 3.4 Block exemptions 3.5 Other exceptions from the prohibition of cartels 3.6 Some important types of anti-competitive agreements Chapter 4 - The prohibition of the abuse of positions of economic power 4.1 Introduction 4.2 The prohibition of the abuse of a position of economic power 4.3 Postscript: the Commission's Discussion Paper on Exclusionary Abuses under Article 82 EC Chapter 5 - Control of concentrations 5.1 Introduction 5.2 The key elements of the EC Merger Regulation 5.3 Merger control in the UK system: the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission Chapter 6 - The Application and Enforcement of Competition Law 6.1 Introduction 6.2 The application of competition law by the courts 6.3 Competition procedure and enforcement under UK law 6.4 Enforcement of EC competition law 6.5 Leniency policy 6.6 Judicial protection in EC competition law 6.7 Division of competence and co-operation between the Commission and the UK authorities (OFT and CC) Chapter 7 - Competition Law and the State 7.1 Introduction 7.2 The rules for public undertakings and undertakings with exclusive or special rights 7.3 The norm of Articles 3(1)(g), 10, 81 and 82 EC 7.4 How to assess conduct in mixed situations? 7.5 EC state aids law: a general introduction Chapter 8 - The international dimensions of competition law 8.1 Introduction 8.2 The geographic scope of application of EC and UK competition law 8.3 International agreements 8.4 Relevant concepts Chapter 9 - Epilogue 9.1. Introduction 9.2. Themes in competition law 9.3. Objectives of EC Competition law and policy 9.4. Does competition law do the job? 9.5. Antitrust procedure 9.6. Fundamental rights 9.7. Block exemptions 9.8. Fostering general Community policies? 9.9. Remedies 9.10. Liberalisation of the closed 9.11. Public service obligations 9.12. Extraterritorial application of EC competition law and international co-operation in the competition law field 9.13. Merger Control 9.14. Article 82 EC 9.15. Articles 3(1)(g) and 10 EC 9.16. Article 86 EC 9.17. Role of national courts 9.18. Harmonisation 9.19. Centralisation & Decentralisation of EC competition law 9.20. Regulation 1/2003/EC 9.21. Competition between Legal Orders 9.22. Targeted sectors and/or issues 9.23. Accession 9.24. Conclusion

Defining Relevant Market Under the European Union Competition Law - Regulations and Practice - Experience for Vietnam

Consten and Grundig and Vertical Agreements

De minimis (hoşgörülebilirlik) kuralı çoğunlukla Anglosakson hukukunda uygulama alanı bulurken, Kara Avrupası hukukunda daha sınırlı bir işleve sahiptir. Buna karşılık kural, Avrupa Birliği hukukunun çeşitli alanlarında ve bilhassa rekabet hukukunda sıklıkla uygulanmaktadır. Rekabet hukuku anlamında de minimis kuralı; normal şartlar altında bir rekabet ihlali oluşturan anlaşma, uyumlu eylem ve kararların; bu anlaşma, uyumlu eylem ve kararların tarafı olan teşebbüslerin iktisadi güçlerinin ve pazar paylarının düşük olması sebebiyle piyasa üzerinde hissedilir bir etki yaratmaması ve bu nedenle ihlal olarak görülmemesi şeklinde tanımlanabilir. Avrupa Birliği rekabet hukuku de minimis kuralını oldukça detaylı düzenlemelere konu ederken, Türk rekabet hukukunda yakın zamana kadar de minimis kuralı ile ilgili açık bir düzenleme yer almamış ve kural, Rekabet Kurulu’nun kararları doğrultusunda şekillenmiştir. Ancak Haziran 2020’de Rekabetin Korunması Hakkında Kanun’da yapılan değişikliklerle de minimis kuralı, Türk rekabet hukukunda ilk kez kanuni düzenlemelere konu olmuştur. Türk hukukundaki bu düzenlemenin mehazı Avrupa Birliği hukukundaki düzenleme olduğu için, konunun mukayeseli olarak ele alınması tercih edilmiştir. Bu kapsamda öncelikle de minimis kuralının tanımı ve benzer kavramlarla ilişkisi ele alınmış, ardından Avrupa Birliği rekabet hukukundaki düzenlemeler incelenmiştir. En son Türk rekabet hukukundaki durum, 2020’de yapılan kanun değişikliği öncesi ve sonrası şeklinde ikiye ayrılarak değerlendirilmiştir.

The Interface between Ec Competition Law and the Competition Laws of the New Member States: Implementation or Innovation?