Taxation and policyholder behavior: the case of guaranteed minimum accumulation benefits

Abstract

AbstractThis paper considers variable annuity (VA) contracts embedded with guaranteed minimum accumulation benefit (GMAB) riders when policyholder’s proceeds are taxed upon early surrender or maturity. These contracts promise the return of the premium paid by the policyholder, or a higher rolled-up value, at the end of the investment period. A partial differential equation valuation framework which exploits the numerical method of lines is used to determine fair fees that render the policyholder and insurer breakeven. Two taxation regimes are considered: one where capital gains are allowed to offset losses and a second where gains do not offset losses. Most insurance providers highlight the tax-deferred features of VA contracts. We show that the regime under which the insured is taxed significantly impacts prices. If losses are allowed to offset gains then this enhances the market, increasing the policyholder’s willingness to participate in the market compared to the case when losses are not allowed to offset gains. With fair fees from the policyholder’s perspective, we show that the net profit is generally positive for insurance companies offering the contract as a naked option without any hedge. We also show how investment policy, as reflected in the Sharpe ratio, impacts and interacts with policyholder persistency.