Tax Structure and Institutional Determinants in Transition Economies

Abstract

Economies that do not have a corporate tax system in their historical heritage have sought to establish a tax system with their independence. The tax structure means the financing free-market reforms of transition economies. The study aims to evaluate the current tax structure of 31 transition economies. Also, the relationship between corruption and total tax burden, GDP per capita, openness, economic freedom, corporate-income-consumption tax rates in 24 transition economies were examined to evaluate the tax structure and the effectiveness of the institutional structure of the tax system. Corruption is high-ranking in countries with a low economic freedom index. GDP per capita is lower in economies with high corruption. Bribery in transition economies is seen as a substitute for tax due to reasons such as high tax burden, low justice in income distribution, and institutional weakness of tax administrations. According to static analysis, a one-unit increase in income per capita in transition economies positively affects corruption at 0.0371%, openness at 0.0134%, economic freedom at 0.0394%, and income tax rate at 0.0122%. According to dynamic analysis, two variables negatively affect corruption. Economic freedom negatively affects the corruption index by 0.073% and excise taxes by 0.108%. On the other hand, tax revenues (0.064), per capita income (0.056), the trade deficit (0.073), and income tax rate (0.063) positively affect corruption.