Abstract

AbstractConservation in human‐dominated landscapes is challenging partly due to the high costs of land acquisition. We explored a property tax mechanism to finance conservation easements or related contracts as a partial‐property acquisition strategy to meet Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) treaty targets to conserve critically imperiled coastal Douglas fir ecosystems in Canada. To maximize cost‐efficiency, we used systematic planning tools to prioritize 198,058 parcels for biodiversity values, estimated the cost of eliminating property tax on high‐priority parcels to engage land owners in conservation, and then calculated the tax increase on nonpriority parcels necessary to maintain tax revenue. Marginal tax rate increases of 0.13, 0.21, and 0.51% on nonpriority parcels were necessary to offset the elimination of tax revenue on ∼21,000 ha of high‐priority parcels, and potentially sufficient to increase area protection from 9% to 17% to meet CBD targets given uptake rates of 100, 50, or 25%, respectively. Sensitivity analyses suggest uptake rates of 30% to 40% could allow government to achieve a 17% target with 30% of the planning area prioritized for inclusion in a property tax mechanism. Our results suggest prioritizing parcels for biodiversity value and commensurate “tax shifting” may offer an efficient route to conservation on private land.

Highlights

  • Developing effective mechanisms to conserve biodiversity in human-dominated landscapes is challenging in part due to the high costs of land acquisition (Naidoo et al 2006; Wunder 2007)

  • Our results indicate that raising property tax rates by as little as 0.13% on parcels of low biodiversity value may be sufficient to offset the elimination of property taxes on high-biodiversity parcels for the purpose of incentivizing conservation on private land given 100% uptake by owners

  • Science-based targets to conserve 30% of landscapes (Cardinall et al 2004; Noss et al 2012) required larger increases in tax rates but appeared feasible given uptake rates of 40% (Table 1). These results imply that, given sufficient uptake by landowners of highbiodiversity parcels, tax shifting may offer an efficient mechanism for governments to meet conservation targets in partnership with private landowners, without reducing tax revenue or requiring land purchase

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Summary

Introduction

Developing effective mechanisms to conserve biodiversity in human-dominated landscapes is challenging in part due to the high costs of land acquisition (Naidoo et al 2006; Wunder 2007). Without the opportunity to transfer state-owned land into dedicated conservation zones, such as statutory protected areas, alternative approaches are needed to protect biodiversity and meet international treaty commitments to conserve 17% of terrestrial ecosystems by 2020 (Convention on Biological Diversity [CBD], 2010). To reach CBD targets, a conservation approach combining formally protected areas and “other effective area based conservation measures,” especially on private lands, will be necessary. A wide variety of tax-funded programs have been developed to engage landowners in conservation actions or the protect greenspace (Hibbard et al 2003; Polyakov & Zhang 2008). Most programs are structured as voluntary agreements between a government agency and a private landowner that allow for tax reductions in return for restrictions or specifications on land use (Polyakov & Zhang 2008)

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