Targeting Civilians in War (review)

Abstract

Reviewed by: Targeting Civilians in War Ethan S. Rafuse Targeting Civilians in War. By Alexander B. Downes. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-8014-4634-4. Illustrations. Notes. Index. Pp. ix, 315. $29.95. The combatant/non-combatant distinction is one of the central concepts around which revolves the notion that there should be principles that impose limits on the use of force in wartime. That this distinction is and has so often been blurred or ignored altogether is a subject that has attracted considerable attention from military leaders, historians, and social scientists. In Targeting Civilians in War, Alexander B. Downes examines the subject through statistical analysis and case studies in which he lays out his argument for questioning theories previously advanced about the willingness of governments to deliberately target civilians in wartime. Specifically, he challenges scholars who have identified regime type (especially those who have argued that democratic governments generally exercise more restraint than non-democratic ones in their treatment of civilians), differences in identity, and organizational concerns as factors in explaining civilian victimization. [End Page 661] Instead, Downes emphasizes two other factors: desperation to win while sparing one's own human and material resources and a desire for territorial conquest. These factors in fact, he argues, make democratic regimes more likely than other types of governments to deliberately target civilians. Like the good political scientist he is, Downes first devotes a couple of chapters to the tasks of defining civilian victimization and presenting a "typology of civilian casualties" that distinguishes between government sanctioned and unsanctioned "intentional", "indiscriminate", and "collateral" civilian targeting. These chapters also lay out other theories on the subject and present statistical analyses (both in the text and using charts) to support Downes's own theses before getting into four historical case studies of instances where belligerents have targeted civilians. These look at the blockades imposed by Great Britain and Imperial Germany during World War I; strategic bombing of the Axis countries during World War II (a perennial favorite subject of students of civilian victimization); the Boer War of 1899-1902; and Israeli treatment of Arab inhabitants of what became the Jewish state during its 1947-49 war for independence. The case studies are very well done. Downes draws upon a respectable range of sources, synthesizing effectively the findings of previous specialized studies on the topics, to provide informative, clearly written, and interesting narratives of events, as well as fairly effective and balanced analysis. In the course of these case studies, he does a solid job of supporting his larger arguments regarding the motives for civilian victimization before presenting a chapter looking at negative cases where civilian victimization did not occur. This chapter points to the wars China has fought since World War II against Korea, India, and Vietnam, the 1982 Falklands War, and the 1991 Persian Gulf War as evidence to support Downes's argument that an ability to settle conflicts quickly restrains governments in their use of violence against civilians. Downes also points to the sanctions imposed on Iraq during the 1990s, which inflicted great suffering on that nation's civilians, as support for his argument that frustration over the failure of traditional conventional strategies to resolve conflicts quickly leads to civilian victimization. While not all readers will be convinced by all of his arguments, Downes deserves great praise for producing a useful, well-researched, strongly argued, and provocative (in the best sense) study of an important topic in military history. These qualities make this study worthy of attention from military historians, civilian strategists, members of the armed forces, and anyone else who has an interest in understanding why the principle of non-combatant immunity has so often fallen by the wayside in modern wars. [End Page 662] Ethan S. Rafuse U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Copyright © 2009 The Society for Military History