Abstract

The national party leaders of Europe, sitting in separate national parliaments from their party’s Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), normally have difficulty influencing MEP policy decisions. This article, after pointing out the obstacles which minimize national party influence, analyzes a new and largely unacknowledged system of MEP coordination and control developed by the British Labour Party. Using data from interviews with Labour’s MEPs, the article concludes that Labour’s leaders have created an influential system of rewards and sanctions that have encouraged a closer and more disciplined relationship in this dualparliamentary setting.

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