歐洲議員投票行為分析：以Six-Pack立法為例

Abstract

Empirical research reveals the party membership of European party group (EPG) is a strong predictor of the voting behaviour of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Yet, we know little about whether this still holds true if the legislative proposals were strongly tied to constrain national budget autonomy and macroeconomic policies. The Lisbon Treaty has significantly enhanced the EP’s formal role in the fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance law-making process by allowing the EP to have co-decision powers under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP). However, there is little research that provides an analysis of MEP voting behaviour in this policy area. This research focuses on the case of the Six-Pack because it is the first fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance legislative package ever to pass through the EP. This research attempts to answer the following questions: When making stronger rules for fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance, do MEPs vote along with political ideologies, national parties, national affiliations or European party groups? To understand the determinants of MEPs vote on the Six-Pack, this thesis looks at 11 amended proposal votes and 6 legislative resolution votes in the Seventh European Parliament. Using multinomial logit regression model, this paper identifies several determinants which affect how MEP vote. First, it finds that the EPG membership variables are highly significant determinants of which way MEPs vote on the Six-Pack. The MEPs from the centre-right EPGs are much more in favour of the Six-Pack, while the MEPs of the radical left or centre-left EPGs are more likely to vote against. Second, the statistic results indicate that MEPs from a member state with a high percentage of public trust in the European Commission are more likely to support for the provisions of stringent fiscal rules in the Six-Pack.