Talking: a potential path to reconciliation in Mindanao: Harmonie Toros

Abstract

Introduction The road to recon cili ation1 is a long one for Mindanao. The latest reincarnation of a Moro rebellion dating back centuries is the nearly 30-year battle of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF ) for self-determination in the southern Philippine archipelago, and although an on-and-off peace pro cess has been going on with the gov ern ment of the Repub lic of the Philippines (GRP) for nearly 15 years, a peace deal has yet to be reached. Meanwhile on the ground, a ceasefire – although repeatedly violated by armed clashes – has overall held since the last bout of major fighting in 2003. This chapter examines the prin ciple mech an ism through which the ceasefire has been maintained, the Coordinating Committee for the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH), which brings together rebel and milit ary leaders as well as rank and file fighters to enforce, monitor and at times reinstate the ceasefire in Mindanao. The aim is to illus trate how talking among state and non-state armed actors can constitute a first step toward recon cili ation – what the editors of this volume define as ‘conciliatory meas ures’ – as well as offer some pro gress toward the second phase of recon cili ation or ‘recon cili ation proper.’ Interestingly, the case of the MILF illus trates how it may be misleading to think of these phases as separate. Indeed, one element that emerges from this case is that conciliatory measures, par ticu larly those involving human contact, can in themselves engender recon cili ation proper among the actors involved and to a certain degree in the wider community. It is im port ant to note that the claim is not being made that the CCCH is the most im port ant mech an ism in the GRP-MILF peace pro cess. It is one, among many, ranging from the formal peace panel negotiating a final agreement to a slew of civil soci ety initiatives. The inter esting aspect of the CCCH is that it involves direct contact between armed actors on both sides – one of which has been accused of using terrorist viol ence – and thus can bring forward inter esting new insights on recon cili ation in con texts of terrorism. The first section of the chapter will engage with the pol itics sur round ing the designation or rather the non-designation of the MILF as a ‘terrorist group.’ It will show how the case of the MILF is par ticu larly inter esting since, accordingto inter views carried out with key gov ern ment and milit ary officials, the Philippine state appears to have consciously refrained from designating the rebels as ‘terrorists’ in order to engage in talks with them. The de cision was thus not related to an ‘ob ject ive’ ana lysis of the methods used by the group or to whether the GRP ‘identifies with’ the perpetrator of the attack, but rather to a specific pol icy de cision of the gov ern ment. After a brief description of the structure and workings of the CCCH mech an ism, the second part of the chapter will illus trate how talking – an embedded and embodied practice that is to be understood as broader than talks and that includes the often casual inter action of actors sharing the same social space – engendered practices of trans forma tion ranging from the symbolic impact of talking to familiarization and trust. These practices in turn con trib uted to a trans forma tion of means and relations as well as a personal trans forma tion of the actors. The third section of the chapter will show how little structural trans forma tion has so far emerged from such talking – a failure that leaves the peace pro cess and the ceasefire in a vulner able con dition, prone to dangerous setbacks. The chapter will conclude by examining what the Mindanao case can tell us about talking and recon cili ation in con texts of terrorist violence.