Taking Cognitive Dualism Seriously: Revisiting the Durkheim-Spencer Debate on the Rise of Individualism

Abstract

The question of the extent to which Durkheim's argument in Division of Labor in Society is continuous with or radically departs from the work of Herbert Spencer has been the subject of a long-standing debate. In this article, the author revisits this issue in light of recent scholarship that points to the pervasive role of the notions of “representation” and “dualism” in Durkheim's overall thought. The analysis shows that Durkheim's conception of the rise of individualism is significantly different from that of Spencer, precisely because it is based on idiosyncratic concepts with no analogue in Spencer's system. Because of this difference, Durkheim's critique of Spencer largely misses the mark and in fact requires an ambiguous projection of Durkheim's own theory-laden notion of individualism toward Spencer, in order to suggest that Spencer begs the question. The author concludes that Durkheim and Spencer had largely incommensurable ideas as to the primary consequence of the division of labor: The rise of “individualism.” This necessitates the analytical distinction between the two conceptions of “the individual,” which I label the “bio-psychological” and the “sociological.”