Abstract

1. Amable B. [2003], The Diversity of Modern Capitalism, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Google Scholar

Highlights

  • Intellectual property rights and market structures play a key role in the development of knowledge sub-systems in a globalised world [Amable, 2003; Kearney, 2009]

  • We show that patents can enable firms to leave a cartel without the risk of retaliation, but the effect of cartel break can be achieved without patents and the ensuing social cost of a temporary monopoly

  • Our theoretical analysis shows that patents can break market collusion

Read more

Summary

Introduction

Intellectual property rights and market structures play a key role in the development of knowledge sub-systems in a globalised world [Amable, 2003; Kearney, 2009]. In turn, identify a prisoner’s dilemma in firms’ product R&D under price competition This kind of dilemma makes firms deviate from market collusion. A patent works like a leniency policy, making a former cartel member immune to potential retaliation or punishment [Kultti et al, 2007]. Such a patenting motive – to leave a cartel – belongs to non-standard functions of patents. Using a reference to Gresham’s law [Giffen, 1891], we can say that “the weaker form of deception drives out the stronger form of deception”

Method
Findings
Conclusions
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call