Sustainable Development of State-Owned Enterprises: Research on the Management Transformation Path of Mixed-Ownership Companies from the Perspective of Shareholders Relationship

Abstract

In recent years, the development of China’s state-owned companies (SOEs) has slowed dramatically due to the improvement of the government–enterprise relationship and maturity in the market system. To accomplish the market-oriented transformation of the management model and promote sustainable development, some SOEs have incorporated private capital to conduct mixed-ownership reforms. Nonetheless, the emergence of heterogeneous shareholder conflicts seriously hampers the transformation of businesses. This paper proposed a two-party evolutionary game model between state-owned and private shareholders in the management transformation of mixed-ownership companies. Based on the proposed model, the evolutionary stability of heterogeneous shareholders’ action strategies was analyzed to obtain the evolutionary stability strategies for the system. The crucial factors of the ideal equilibrium strategies are studied at the same time. The analysis results show that the probability of “change” in private shareholders is positively proportional to factors such as the success rate of change, change dividend, control gain, and policy burden, and it is inversely proportional to the factors including the cost of change, contractual cost of private shareholders, the additional cost of change, hidden income, state-owned shareholders’ shareholding ratio, and loss of change failure. Finally, the findings of this study provide a theoretical foundation for the transition of mixed-ownership enterprises’ management systems.