Abstract
Abstract It is becoming increasingly common for the developers of safety critical systems to have to produce formal evidence that a system is safe so that the system can be certified prior to deployment. In practice a safety case will contain (but not be limited to) a set of arguments, each of which is intended to show that some particular safety goal has been satisfied. Our aim in this paper is threefold: to indicate the problems of developing safety cases and to indicate scenarios in which a safety case management tool might be useful; to outline the concepts of a tool known as SAM which is being developed to support the development and management of safety cases; to indicate the utility of these concepts by showing a fragment of the (top levels of) a safety case for a large commercial aircraft. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the difficulties of producing and managing such safety cases.
Published Version
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call