Abstract
I have argued that Scalar consequentialism is incoherent, but restricted-scope scalar consequentialism is not. Although it is not incoherent, restricted-scope scalar consequentialism is counter-intuitive, and depends on the claim that moral and nonmoral reasons are incomparable. Norcross claimed that ‘the significance each of us [ought to give] to … moral reasons, relative to other reasons, such as prudential and aesthetic reasons, is not something that can be settled by a moral theory.’1 But this is a claim that needs to be argued for and Norcross does not provide the argument. Until an argument is offered, it is not clear why we should take restricted-scope scalar consequentialism seriously, given the very counter-intuitive implications of the theory. If a convincing argument were forthcoming for the incomparability of moral and non-moral reasons, we would have to take restricted-scope scalar consequentialism seriously.
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