An Argument for Consequentialism

Abstract

The most common way to choose among moral theories is to test how well they cohere with our intuitions or considered judgments about what is morally right and wrong, about the nature or ideal of a person, and about the purpose(s) of morality.1 Another kind of intuition is often overlooked. We also have intuitions about principles of practical and moral reasoning, such as those captured by deontic logic. In order to be principles of reasoning rather than substance, these principles must be consistent with all substantive moral theories. But consistency is not enough. We want the deeper kind of coherence that comes only with explanation. A moral theory that simply reports the principles behind common moral reasoning but cannot explain why these principles are so common or so plausible is inferior in this respect to another moral theory which not only includes the principles but also explains why they are true. Why is the explanatory theory better? Because we want a moral theory to help us understand moral reasoning, and such understanding is gained only when our principles are explained. Without such understanding, our intuitions do not seem justified, and we cannot know whether or how to extend our principles to new situations. These are reasons to prefer a moral theory that explains our principles of moral reasoning. This preference for explanation provides a new method for choosing among competing moral theories. I will illustrate and apply this method in this paper. First, I will argue that a certain principle holds for reasons for action in general and for moral reasons in particular. Next, I will argue that this principle of moral reasoning cannot be explained by deontological moral theories or by traditional forms of consequentialism. Finally, I will outline a new kind of consequentialism that provides a natural explanation of this principle of moral reasoning. Its explanatory power is a reason to prefer this new version of consequentialism.