'Stylized' Opposition in the U. S. House of Representatives: The Effects of Coalition Behavior

Abstract

Coalition research suggests that players will sacrifice short term goals to maintain the of a stable alliance. The proposition is extended to effects on other political behaviors. Specifically, do stable alliances determine the range and kind of possible opposition among a set of political actors: in effect, prohibiting conflict in one sphere that would threaten the of a stable alliance in another, entirely different sphere? To what extent do efforts at keeping the trust constrain the incidence and location of political conflict? House coalition activity from the 85th through the 91st Congresses serves as a preliminary test case for the proposition. The time span includes a number of years of stable alliances and one point of change. Results show: 1) partners in a stable alliance very rarely oppose each other, choosing instead to remain inactive; 2) this constraint on opposition holds across issues, including those outside the areas of traditional alliance; and 3) given a change in the traditional alliance, patterns of opposition and inactivity also change sharply for the old and the new alliances. With the change, opposition appears and disappears on different kinds of issues.