Abstract
AbstractDrawing on approximately 4000 face‐to‐face interviews with lower house members from seventeen Latin American countries, this article demonstrates how partisan considerations shape legislators' preferences for power‐sharing institutions. Distributive models argue that reforming parties derive preferences based on potential advantages in power allocation, yet the role of individual legislators remains underexplored. The evidence reveals that legislators favor institutional arrangements that maximize their party's influence. Representatives from larger parties prefer electoral rules that reduce the number of parties in the House, while incumbent lawmakers support a stronger executive. Notably, party positions often shift following changes in electoral fortunes: Parties become more favorable of proportional representation after losing seats and advocate for reinforced congressional authority upon leaving office.
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