Abstract
In 1972, when the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment was held in Stockholm, there wonly about three dozen multilateral environmental agreements. Today there are more than 900 international legal instruments (mostly binding) that are either focused on environment or contain one or more impor tant provisions concerned with environment. 1 These instruments are viewed as primary means for affecting the behaviour of States and the many other actors today: subnational governments, industries, non-governmental organizations and individuals. They involve substantial costs to states and to the targeted and interested actors, whether in the negotiations for the agreements or their implementation. Until recently little attention has been given to the extent to which States and other actors com ply with these agreements.2 In this article, I argue that compliance is a complex process involving both the intent and the capacity of States, that the three alterna tive compliance strategies embodied in international agreements - sunshine, incentives, and sanctions - and the institutional design of agreements affects intent and capacity, and that the choice of strategies must be tar geted to individual countries' intent and capacity. More over, the preferred strategy choices vary across different areas of international agreements: trade, labour, human rights, arms control, and environment. This article is based on research conducted with Harold K. Jacobson and colleagues as part of a nine count?, study of five international environmental agreements.
Published Version
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