Strategy Versus Statecraft in Crimea

Abstract

Abstract: The March 2014 annexation of Crimea may be interpreted as a contest between Russian strategy and Western statecraft. The respective natures of strategy and statecraft differ substantially, which predetermined parameters and outcome of Crimean crisis. This makes an excellent case study of interaction between strategy and statecraft, and shows why strategy trumps statecraft in direct confrontations. ********** Even as Russia continues to undermine eastern Ukraine with provocateurs from within and massed troops from without, it is fair to say Crimean component of ongoing Ukrainian crisis has concluded. This clearly important historical event will be mined for further insight into Russian foreign policy, as well as statecraft and international relations, for years to come. Contemporary commentary on crisis ranges from blame to vociferous defense by Russia's premier international propaganda arm, Russia Today. Academics blogged throughout to consider political, economic, and other implications in real time as crisis developed. With Crimea now annexed by Russia (even though questions about Russian intentions toward rest of Ukraine continue), it is possible to step back and consider crisis as a whole. Why and how did Russia so easily impose its will upon course of events? Why did statecraft practiced by Western powers appear so weak and anemic? This article suggests dynamics and outcome of Crimean crisis were determined by disparate assumptions and methods of thinking on part of West and of Russia. The West practiced statecraft. Russia entered into Crimea anticipating need for strategy as classically understood--using force to gain its political ends though ultimately their threat of force sufficed. This difference between statecraft and strategy dominated entire affair. To illustrate importance of this distinction, respective natures of strategy and statecraft will be explored as lenses through which to examine crisis. Finally, because strategy and statecraft differ so significantly, real and anticipated post-crisis consequences of statecraft will be considered, even though that statecraft now no longer opposes strategy in any immediate sense. Strategy and Statecraft: Respective Natures Although classical strategy is a subset of statecraft, their natures are different. The nature of strategy differs significantly from that of statecraft, even though both ultimately subscribe to Andre Beaufre's proposal that [a]ny dialectical contest is a contest for freedom of action. (1) However, strategy approaches question of freedom of action differently from statecraft, a divergence stemming from fundamental assumptions and ways of thinking which respectively underpin two, particularly concerning role of military force. It is because of sheer difference between nature of force, on one hand, and all other instruments of political power, on other hand, that one must make a clear distinction between threat or use of force and employment of all other political tools. This difference renders many modern definitions of strategy obscure by implying functional equality between all instruments of power. Strategy, in its classical sense (as a concept solely dedicated to understanding and mastering military force) when employed side-by-side with wider concept of statecraft, adopts natures of instruments available. Force and its political utility are thus primary concerns of strategy. Colin Gray has defined strategy as the use that is made of force and threat of force for ends of policy. (2) Threatened (or actual) violence is, therefore, first instrument in strategist's toolkit. Such threat of or use of force may well be reciprocated by opposing party, giving rise to adversarial, reciprocal nature of strategy. …