The Fallacy of the Military Strategic Objective

Abstract

Abstract : In today's globalized world of an increasingly complex and unpredictable enemy, it is absolutely critical that U.S. leaders, both civilian and military, have complete understanding of how the different instruments of national power can contribute towards the achievement of national strategic objectives. In Irregular Warfare (IW), it has been proven throughout history that a superior military force alone is not enough to guarantee the achievement of strategic level objectives making cooperation with the agencies that represent other instruments of power absolutely essential in order to reach a political Desired End State (DES). U.S. doctrine further insists that the military instrument of power should only be employed when the other instruments have been completely exhausted, but in reality this principle is seldom applied in U.S. policy or strategy. The premise of a military strategic objective is a fallacy which serves to segregate the means by which strategic objectives are pursued and ultimately jeopardizes achievement of the DES. This paper analyzes the theory behind strategic objectives and their relationship to the instruments of national power, compares this relationship to current U.S. doctrine, and then applies both theory and doctrine to recent military operations. It is through this examination that the fallacy of a military strategic objective is revealed. The many problems associated with this fallacy are brought to light through a historical analysis of Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama during the late 1980s and more recently during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The paper concludes with proposed changes for the future as potential solutions to these problems and further makes recommendations in order to facilitate these changes which are presented as a way ahead.