Strategy and Fairness in Social Decision Making: Sometimes It Pays to Be Powerless

Abstract

Building on the social utility model, the present article investigates the importance of absolute and comparative payoffs in social decision making. In two experimental studies, we compared offers in Ultimatum games with offers in Dictator games. Results suggest that Ultimatum games evoke a strategic motivation and that Dictator games evoke a concern for fairness. Interestingly, the results also indicate that participants offered more money to the recipient in Dictator games than in Ultimatum games. Apparently, sometimes you are better off being “powerless” (i.e., being a recipient in a Dictator game) than being “powerful” (i.e., being a recipient in an Ultimatum game). Results are discussed in terms of the distribution of power in both games and the effect of power distributions on the relative weight of absolute and comparative payoffs.