Abstract
BackgroundThe aim of this study was to determine whether people respond differently to low and high stakes in Dictator and Ultimatum Games. We assumed that if we raised the stakes high enough, we would observe more self-orientated behavior because fairness would become too costly, in spite of a possible risk of a higher punishment.MethodsA questionnaire was completed by a sample of 524 university students of biology. A mixed linear model was used to test the relation between the amount at stake (CZK 20, 200, 2,000, 20,000 and 200,000, i.e., approximately $1–$10,000) and the shares, as well as the subjects’ gender and the design of the study (single vs. multiple games for different amounts).ResultsWe have discovered a significant relationship between the amount at stake and the minimum acceptable offer in the Ultimatum Game and the proposed shares in both Ultimatum and Dictator Games (p = 0.001, p<0.001, p = 0.0034). The difference between playing a single game or more games with several amounts at stake did not influence the relation between the stakes and the offered and minimum acceptable shares. Women proved significantly more generous than men in their offers in the Dictator Game (p = 0.007).ConclusionOur results suggest that people’s behavior in the Dictator and Ultimatum Games depends on the amount at stake. The players tended to lower their relative proposed shares, as well as their relative minimum acceptable offers. We propose that the Responders’ sense of equity and fair play depends on the stakes because of the costs of maintaining fairness. However, our results also suggest that the price of fairness is very high and that it is very difficult, probably even impossible, to buy the transition of Homo sociologicus into Homo economicus.
Highlights
The Ultimatum Game was designed by Guth, Schmittberger and Schwarze [1] to study strategies in bargaining under a specific kind of ultimatum
If we look at other experimental economic games, we find evidence of the influence of high stakes in the Trust Game [22], where the senders sent relatively less if the stakes were high; the difference was not significant as regards the proportions sent back by the receivers, which corresponds with findings from the Dictator Game (DG)
The dependent variables in the LMM analysis were the relative shares offered in the DG and the Ultimatum Game (UG) and the relative minimum acceptable offers (MAOs) in the UG; the explanatory variables were a logarithm of the amount at stake and two binary variables, the treatment and gender
Summary
The Ultimatum Game was designed by Guth, Schmittberger and Schwarze [1] to study strategies in bargaining under a specific kind of ultimatum. The game involves two experimental subjects, usually called the Proposer and the Responder. The Proposer is given a certain amount by the experimenter which he can divide between themself and the Responder. The Responder can either accept their share or reject it. Neither of them gets anything from the initial amount at stake. Each gets the share offered by the Proposer. The subjects do not know or see each other and all contact between them is mediated by the experimenter. The aim of this study was to determine whether people respond differently to low and high stakes in Dictator and Ultimatum Games. We assumed that if we raised the stakes high enough, we would observe more self-orientated behavior because fairness would become too costly, in spite of a possible risk of a higher punishment
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