Abstract
Cooperation is a very common, yet not fully-understood phenomenon in natural and human systems. The introduction of a network within the population is known to affect the outcome of cooperative dynamics, allowing for the survival of cooperation in adverse scenarios. Recently, the introduction of multiplex networks has yet again modified the expectations for the outcome of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, compared to the monoplex case. However, much remains unstudied regarding other social dilemmas on multiplex, as well as the unexplored microscopic underpinnings of it. In this paper, we systematically study the evolution of cooperation in all four games in the T − S plane on multiplex. More importantly, we find some remarkable and previously unknown features in the microscopic organization of the strategies, that are responsible for the important differences between cooperative dynamics in monoplex and multiplex. Specifically, we find that in the stationary state, there are individuals that play the same strategy in all layers (coherent), and others that don’t (incoherent). This second group of players is responsible for the surprising fact of a non full-cooperation in the Harmony Game on multiplex, never observed before, as well as a higher-than-expected cooperation rates in some regions of the other three social dilemmas.
Highlights
Strategical incoherence regulates cooperation in social dilemmas on multiplex networks Joan T
An innovative way of representing multiple types of social interactions in one single structure is the use of multiplex networks[23,24,25,26], which have been already successfully applied to the study of disease spreading[27] and diffusion dynamics[28]
To ascertain the outcome of the cooperative dynamics for the different games on multiplex networks, we will start by studying the stationary level of cooperation in the system, we will study the effect of the initial fraction of cooperators, and we will move to analyzing in detail the microscopic organization of cooperation for individuals across different layers
Summary
Strategical incoherence regulates cooperation in social dilemmas on multiplex networks Joan T. We find that in the stationary state, there are individuals that play the same strategy in all layers (coherent), and others that don’t (incoherent) This second group of players is responsible for the surprising fact of a non full-cooperation in the Harmony Game on multiplex, never observed before, as well as a higher-than-expected cooperation rates in some regions of the other three social dilemmas. Some work has been done to understand the evolution of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game on multiplex networks[30], exploring different coupled evolutionary games using a interdependent networks[31]. The evolution of cooperation on top of multiplex networks with any number of layers hasn’t been systematically studied for all four social dilemmas
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