Abstract

Cooperation is a very common, yet not fully-understood phenomenon in natural and human systems. The introduction of a network within the population is known to affect the outcome of cooperative dynamics, allowing for the survival of cooperation in adverse scenarios. Recently, the introduction of multiplex networks has yet again modified the expectations for the outcome of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, compared to the monoplex case. However, much remains unstudied regarding other social dilemmas on multiplex, as well as the unexplored microscopic underpinnings of it. In this paper, we systematically study the evolution of cooperation in all four games in the T − S plane on multiplex. More importantly, we find some remarkable and previously unknown features in the microscopic organization of the strategies, that are responsible for the important differences between cooperative dynamics in monoplex and multiplex. Specifically, we find that in the stationary state, there are individuals that play the same strategy in all layers (coherent), and others that don’t (incoherent). This second group of players is responsible for the surprising fact of a non full-cooperation in the Harmony Game on multiplex, never observed before, as well as a higher-than-expected cooperation rates in some regions of the other three social dilemmas.

Highlights

  • “In order to evaluate such convergence, we fit the last tγ time steps of the evolution to a linear trend, c (t) = α + βt using the QR decomposition method”

  • In the Supplementary Information file originally published with this Article, there are typographical errors

  • In the section under ‘Analysis of Fluctuations’, “For each one of the I repetitions of the experiment we fit a linear model to the final tγ time steps of the simulation, c (t) i = αi + βit.” should read: “For each one of the I repetitions of the experiment we fit a linear model to the final tγ time steps of the simulation, c i (t) = αi + βit.”

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Summary

Introduction

OPEN Erratum: Strategical incoherence regulates cooperation in social dilemmas on multiplex networks

Results
Conclusion

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