Strategic voting, party activity, and candidate effects: testing explanations for split voting in New Zealand's new mixed system

Abstract

Recent research on voting in Germany's mixed electoral system suggests that split voting has more to do with voter confusion than sophistication, although this remains a matter of debate. We examine this question in the context of New Zealand's new mixed system, which is modeled after Germany's. We focus on alternative explanations for split voting. One is derived from theories of strategic voting, which hypothesizes that voters will split their votes when their preferred party's candidate is not viable in single member district (SMD) contests. We also consider the influence of party attachments and candidate preference. We examine these explanations using both aggregate and individual level data. The assumption that split voting in mixed systems is largely due to confusion is not supported in New Zealand as split voters cast votes in predictable patterns. In particular, we find that strategic defections are more likely to occur when the preferred candidate is not viable. Those with higher levels of political knowledge are more likely to defect from nonviable candidates. Partisan attachments and candidate effects also help to explain split voting.