Strategic intent and incentives in an industry organisation: the case of the board of airline representatives Australia

Abstract

The focus of this study was the Board of Airline Representatives of Australia (BARA), a voluntary, non-profit organisation, established as an incorporated body in 1989, (although operating unofficially in previous years) to afford a recognised means of communication between the airlines and relevant statutory and other bodies in Australia, whose interests and actions influence those of the airlines. BARA is an industry organisation who monitors, evaluates and petitions other agencies in the airline industry for the benefit of its membership in regard to airport regulations, agreements and charges, aviation infrastructure, safety and security, the processing of airline customers, and industrial relations. The interrelationship between effective membership and organisational strategy has significant ramifications for the success of Boards of Airline Representatives elsewhere in the world and for umbrella organisations such as the International Air Transport Association (IATA). The conceptual framework presented in the paper uses theory underlying strategic intent and incentives for voluntary membership in industry organisations as well as membership participation. A stated choice experiment embedded within a self-administered survey was used to clarify the strategic direction of BARA; investigate incentives used to retain membership in the context where non-members benefit from its activities, and ascertain choices that members make in relation to their participation.