Strategic behavior and policy choice on the U.S. Supreme Court

Abstract

@fmct:Contents @toc4:List of Figures and Tables Preface Acknowledgments @toc1:Part I: Theories of Supreme Court Decision-Making @toc2:1 Introduction @toc3:Plan of the Book @toc2:2 Seven Distinctions in the Literature @toc3:Distinction #1: A Psychological Metaphor vs. A Rational-Choice Metaphor Distinction #2: Theories of Attitude Activation vs. Theories of Rational Choice Distinction #3: Theories of Choice vs. Theories of Measurement Distinction #4: Explaining Final Votes vs. Explaining What Final Opinion Is Adopted Distinction #5: Explaining Just the Final vs. Explaining All Five Stages of Decision-Making Distinction #6: Theories of Sincere Rational Choice vs. Theories of Rational Choice Distinction #7: A Status-Quo Policy vs. No Status-Quo Policy Conclusion @toc2:3 Assessing Previous Theories of Supreme Court Decision-Making @toc3:The Pioneers: Pritchett, Schubert, and Murphy Schubert's Attitude-Activation Model Attitudinal Model Conceptual Problems with the Attitudinal Model Other Issues Involving the Attitudinal Model Literature on Strategically-Rational Justices Conclusion @toc1:Part II: A Formal Model of Supreme Court Decision-Making @toc2:4 Why Formal Models? @toc3:The Role of Theories and Models in Empirical Research Some Potential Benefits from Formal Modeling Potential Costs and Other Criticisms of Formal Modeling How Can We Be Sure That the Potential Benefits Exceed the Potential Costs? Conclusion @toc2:5 Definitions and Assumptions @toc3:Lines, Points, and Utility Functions Status Quo Policy Preferred-To Sets and Win-Sets Number of Justices An Informational Assumption Sincere and Behavior Independence of Cases Joining, Concurring, and Dissenting Costless Opinion Writing Conclusion @toc2:6 Coalition Formation and the Final @toc3:When Can the Status Quo Policy Be Upset? What Are the Constraints on the Set of Policies Which Could Be Adopted? What Policies Do Different Majority Coalitions Prefer to SQ? How Do Justices Behave When They Dislike the Majority Opinion? Agenda-Control Version Open-Bidding Version Median-Holdout Version Comparison of the Agenda-Control, Open-Bidding, and Median-Holdout Versions Is Agenda-Control Behavior Unstable? Summary of Major Results @toc2:7 Opinion Assignment @toc3:Self-Assignment As An Opinion-Assignment Strategy Alternative Opinion-Assignment Strategies Opinion Assignment by a Justice Outside WJmed(SQ) Opinion Assignment by a Justice Inside WJmed(SQ) Opinion Assignment by a Minority-Side Justice Would An Opinion Assigner Prefer Larger Coalitions? How Much Does Opinion Assignment Matter? Summary of Major Results @toc2:8 Conference @toc3:Different Kinds of Strategic Behavior from Different Kinds of Justices Strategic Behavior by the Chief Justice Strategic Behavior by an Associate Justice Who Could Become the Opinion Assigner Strategic Behavior by a Low-Seniority Justice Who Cannot Become the Opinion Assigner What If Everyone Behaves Strategically? When Does the Chief Justice Self-Assign? Will the Chief Justice Trust What Other Justices Say on the Conference Vote? Summary of Major Results @toc2:9 Certiorari @toc3:Sincere Behavior on Certiorari Decisions Strategic Behavior on Certiorari Decisions Aggressive Granting and Defensive Denial When Justices Are Strategic Summary of Major Results @toc1:Part III: Future Directions for Theories of Supreme Court Decision-Making @toc2:10 Empirical Implications @toc3:Understanding the Five Stages of Supreme Court Decision-Making Non-Strategic or Sincere Behavior on the Supreme Court Vote Switching between the Original and Final Votes Problems of Empirical Measurement Conclusion @toc2:11 Future Research @toc3:Do the Justices Have Perfect Information about Each Other's Preferences? Do the Justices Always Have Clear and Fixed Preferences? Are Supreme Court Cases Independent from Each Other? Regular and Special Concurrences How Many Issue Dimensions Are There? Costly Opinion-Writing Extensions of the Model Exogenous Preferences and the Impact of The Law Broader Applications Conclusion @toc4:Notes References Index