Strategic Ambiguity, Strategic Clarity, or Dual Clarity: U.S. Policy Debates over the Prevention of a Taiwan Strait Crisis

Abstract

Shortly after U.S. President George W. Bush stated in interviews that the United States would do whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend itself, pundits began to debate whether Washington, while studying the prevention of a Taiwan Strait crisis, was considering abandoning its long-held ”strategic ambiguity” position. Prior to Bush's remarks, U.S. thinktanks had made various propositions regarding Washington's options in the case of a use of force by Beijing in the Taiwan Strait. In the first proposition, the U.S. government is urged to retain its ”strategic ambiguity.” Namely, in the absence of a defined crisis, specifying Washington's conditions for intervention or not in various scenarios over the Taiwan Strait might inadvertently lead to one party's inclination to provoke or irritate the other party. In the second proposition, before any crisis erupts in the Taiwan Strait, Washington should promptly make Beijing aware of the U.S. indisputable stance that it will use military intervention in such a crisis so as to deter China from escalating tensions. This article compares the two propositions, examines the pros and cons, and identifies the policymakers and thinktanks behind them. In recent years, the Bush administration is believed to have replaced ”strategic clarity” with ”dual clarity,” i.e. Washington will defend Taiwan should the island be attacked without making any provocative attempt, and it will make another political pledge to Beijing not to support Taiwan independence.