Strait Rituals: China, Taiwan, and the United States in the Taiwan Strait Crises, 1954–1958 by Pang Yang Huei

Abstract

Reviewed by: Strait Rituals: China, Taiwan, and the United States in the Taiwan Strait Crises, 1954–1958 by Pang Yang Huei Xiaobing Li bli@uco.edu Pang Yang Huei Strait Rituals: China, Taiwan, and the United States in the Taiwan Strait Crises, 1954–1958 . Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2019. 317 pp. $55.00 (cloth). Few areas of research on international crises are more difficult than the Taiwan Strait crises of the 1950s, due to their historical role in the origins of the Cold War in East Asia and their unique geopolitical position in relation to the ongoing tensions among the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan), and the United States. Conventional texts have adopted a Cold War approach, characterizing the Taiwan Strait crises as byproducts or a sideshow of the confrontation between two contending camps: the free world and Communism. Therefore, the crises resulted naturally from an ideological conflict, misunderstanding, or miscommunication of the other's intention. The communication obstacle between Communist and non-Communist governments was that each projected themselves into the frame of reference within which the other operated. On the basis of extensive, multiarchive research, Pang Yang Huei diverts from the usual Cold War approach, focusing instead on the relatively neglected area of each government's national interest, security concern, and a "quiet diplomacy" (267) through their "tacit communication" (268). His interpretation of the tacit accommodation process "allows one to appreciate the complexity of adversarial and alliance diplomacy" (6) and makes a new contribution to this case study. Beginning in the first chapter, Pang follows major historical events and introduces his approach and sources. Then, he sets up a stage for the crises in chapters 2–4 by providing a historical background of PRC-ROC-United States relations from 1950 to 1954, emphasizing the Geneva Conference (1954) as "a foundation for Sino-US tacit communication" (49). Nancy Bernkopf Tucker's work indicated that the Truman and Eisenhower administrations made commitments to Taiwan's security in the early 1950s, despite it being riddled with mistrust, ignorance, and "strategic ambiguity." 1 In retrospect, US policy and the Korean War simultaneously disengaged the Chinese from their hot civil war and engaged them in the global Cold War. Harry Truman's legacy was to keep the Taiwan Strait military struggle "cold" and build the basis for political and international competition in which both Chinese parties could find alternatives or potentially a peaceful solution to their civil struggle. Truman did not intend to postpone the Chinese Civil War or provide Beijing with a different reason to attack Taipei. Leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Beijing understood Truman's policy and stopped their planned landing operation against Taiwan in 1950–1953. 2 Certainly, the Korean War played an important role in Beijing's strategic shift from the Taiwan Strait to the Korean Peninsula. Pang devotes chapters 5 and 6 to the crisis of 1954–1955 and shows that "a ritualized pattern of diplomacy emerged in spite of the belligerent rhetoric hurled around" (152). Scholars have searched for the answers to Chinese war decisions and use of military forces. 3 In 1954, Beijing perceived unmistakable indications that the Taipei-Washington collaboration was accelerating. If a quick and effective message was not conveyed to the Eisenhower administration, Beijing believed, American cooperation would legitimize Taiwan within international politics, hindering the PRC's goal of gaining full acceptance [End Page E-14] in the international community. On the one hand, Chinese leaders seemed willing to accept the fact that the PLA (People's Liberation Army; the PRC's armed forces), as a weak army, would not fight the superior US armed forces in the Taiwan Strait if the Americans made a commitment to its defense. On the other hand, Beijing used armed forces in the Taiwan Strait explicitly to demonstrate its determination as well as to encourage possible restraint from Washington. Meanwhile, US nuclear threats in the spring of 1955 forced Chinese leaders' momentous decision to make their own nuclear bomb. Thus, the 1954–1955 Taiwan Strait crisis may be viewed as the starting point of China's nuclear weapons development program. 4...