Stochastic Evolutionary Game Model of Bidding Behavior for Electricity Purchase and Sale in Power Market

Abstract

There are a lot of random interference factors in the power market, which seriously affect the bidding behavior between power generation and power purchasing enterprises. So, in this paper the Gaussian white noise is introduced into the replication dynamic equation to reflect the random interference in the multi-agent bidding process of electricity purchase and sale in the power market, and a random dynamic system is established. The stochastic evolutionary game model of three heterogeneous groups under asymmetric information is constructed, and the model is solved by using stochastic differential equation theory. From the three aspects of enterprise quotation strategy, enterprise income and incentive measures, this paper analyzes the conditions for the gradual stability of bidding behavior in the process of random evolutionary game between power purchasing and power selling groups. The stability of bidding behavior in the process of stochastic evolutionary game between power purchasing and selling groups is analyzed. Finally, taking the bidding behavior of three heterogeneous groups as an example, the dynamic evolution simulation of bidding behavior in power market is carried out. The results show that the established model can more accurately reflect the evolution process of the bidding behavior of each group under the interference of random factors, and is closer to the dynamic change process of the bidding behavior of each power sale and purchase in the actual environment.