Abstract
I explore the possibility and rationality of interpersonal mechanisms of doxastic self-control, that is, ways in which individuals can make use of other people in order to get themselves to stick to their beliefs. I look, in particular, at two ways in which people can make interpersonal epistemic commitments, and thereby willingly undertake accountability to others, in order to get themselves to maintain their beliefs in the face of anticipated “epistemic temptations”. The first way is through the avowal of belief, and the second is through the establishment of collective belief. I argue that both of these forms of interpersonal epistemic commitment can function as effective tools for doxastic self-control, and, moreover, that the control they facilitate should not be dismissed as irrational from an epistemic perspective.
Highlights
Amongst the epistemic virtues perhaps the most prized are openness and sensitivity to evidence
Like practical self-control, doxastic self-control is needed to overcome certain forms of characteristic weakness. Such control might be exerted in the formation of belief, as when a person takes pains to gather all the relevant evidence before she makes up her mind – rather than judging on the basis of a small, perhaps convenient, portion of it
I think that response would be too hasty. This is because the reasons for sticking to one’s beliefs these mechanisms produce are not themselves the right kind of reasons for believing, they are not entirely non-epistemic reasons either, on a par with the proverbial “health or financial” reasons for believing sometimes associated with non-evidentialism. It seems that the interpersonal accountability a person incurs through avowal and collective belief is in an important sense an epistemic form of responsibility, and so may yet promote epistemically responsible, truth-conducive believing
Summary
Amongst the epistemic virtues perhaps the most prized are openness and sensitivity to evidence. Like practical self-control, doxastic self-control is needed to overcome certain forms of characteristic weakness Such control might be exerted in the formation of belief, as when a person takes pains to gather all the relevant evidence before she makes up her mind – rather than judging on the basis of a small, perhaps convenient, portion of it. Leo Charles Townsend the maintenance of belief, as when a person takes steps to guard her rationally-held beliefs from “epistemic temptations” (Paul 2015a) or “distorters” (Pettit 2016b) It is this latter, diachronic form of doxastic self-control that will be my specific focus here. I suggest that neither of these mechanisms would be deemed rational by the lights of a strict evidentialist, they can be considered rational from a slightly more relaxed perspective, since they do seem capable of promoting true, responsible believing
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