Staying the course: Denuclearization and path dependence in the US's North Korea policy

Why do states that make a deliberate effort to pursue rapprochement sometimes fail? This article dissects US–North Korea relations between 1994 and 2002 as one way to better understand how deliberate decisions to dramatically improve relations with a historical adversary go awry. This vastly understudied period in US–North Korea relations started in late 1994 with an ambitious agreement to move toward diplomatic normalization through a gradual process based on reciprocal “action for action,” abruptly ending in 2002 with mutual acrimony and the resumption of long-standing hostility. Why did reciprocity strategies by both sides in the intervening period fail to deliver the promised relational change? The seemingly obvious explanation—a lack of consensus among US policy elites about North Korea policy—does not fit with what actually happened. Moreover, theories of rapprochement that might have anticipated success in the US–North Korea case cannot readily explain why rapprochement failed without resorting to situation-specific factors, which undermines their explanatory power. At the same time, theories of rapprochement that would have correctly predicted failure, on the basis of identity incompatibility or other unfavorable conditions, offer an incomplete account of events. Such rapprochement pessimists struggle to explain why the United States would seek rapprochement with North Korea if the prospects of success were so predictably dim, why the Clinton administration would settle on the rapprochement approach it did, and why it would simultaneously pursue rapprochement while publicly promoting North Korea as a threat. …

North Korea's missile and nuclear tests conducted unilaterally have put China's North Korea policy under intense internal and external pressures. The dramatic developments since 2018 like the détente of the two Koreas and the unprecedented US–North Korea summits are not to be seen as signs that China has played an effective role through its North Korea policy. Why does North Korea always seem to have the upper hand in its relationship with China despite its obvious unilateral economic dependence on China? How did Sino–North Korean relations evolve into their current contradictory state? What is the nature of their relationship? This article considers these questions by analysing China's North Korea policy over the past three decades, since the end of the Cold War. Current research mainly focuses on analyses of specific periods and the interpretation of specific events. By systemically investigating the policy evolution in the past 30 years, this article argues that the US-centric mentality is the primary variable for informing China's perception and policy towards North Korea after the Cold War.

This article examines the intricate dynamics of US‐China and US–North Korea relations, focusing on the strategic competition between the United States and China. Drawing upon the realist theories of Kissinger and Mearsheimer, the study delves into how various intensities of US‐China conflict might influence North Korea's strategic value and the prospects for improved US–North Korea relations. The research underscores that escalating US‐China competition could reshape the geopolitical landscape in Northeast Asia, paving the way for new strategic alignments and partnerships. Four distinct scenarios are presented, each reflecting a different intensity of US‐China conflict and the ensuing reactions from both North Korea and the USA. The analysis suggests that the most probable scenario entails an intensifying US‐China rivalry, which correspondingly elevates North Korea's strategic significance. Such a turn of events would necessitate a shift in US strategy – from isolating North Korea to forging more favorable geopolitical conditions. Potential strategies might include reducing North Korea's reliance on China, disrupting the alignment between China, Russia, and North Korea, or even contemplating the integration of Pyongyang into the US security framework. These strategic adjustments could reshape the power dynamics and address regional challenges in Northeast Asia, promoting peace and stability and safeguarding the nation's core interests.

Significance The resolution was a Democratic attempt at damage control after comments by a newly elected caucus member that were perceived as anti-Semitic: the party fears being tagged as ‘anti-Israel’ before 2020’s elections. This resolution is the latest move in a brewing congressional battle over the Boycott-Divest-Sanction movement, which brings together several US anti-Israel groups. The rallying cry for this issue is the proposed Israel Anti-Boycott Act, which has 292 co-sponsors in the House and 58 in the Senate. Impacts The White House will resist congressional efforts to limit the president’s foreign policy powers. The US-Mexico-Canada Agreement will be agreed but could be delayed for final changes. Congress will seek a greater role on US North Korea, Saudi Arabia and Iran policy. US-Russia policy will be a sticking point between the Democrats and Trump White House.

A review of German reunification in 1990 shows that a peaceful reunification can be explained as the result of an interaction between the centrifugal forces in international dimension in favour of the status quo and the centripetal forces in internal dimension towards reunification. Similarly, a peaceful reunification of Korea is assumed to occur when international forces against reunification can be minimized, while internal (inter-Korean) forces for reunification are maximized. On the one hand, the geostrategic concerns of Korea’s four neighbouring states (the United States, China, Japan, and Russia) about the uncertain future of reunified Korea have been the important source of strong centrifugal forces. Four states view the issue of Korean reunification from the perspective of their strategic games with others. Three major factors—the lack of multilateral security cooperation mechanism in Northeast Asia, hostile US–North Korea relations, and China’s concern on losing strategic buffer zone—have strengthened centrifugal forces. On the other hand, South Korean governments’ political efforts to improve inter-Korean relations, and thereby strengthen centripetal forces, could not bear fruit. Two major factors—the lack of bipartisan consensus on North Korea policy between the liberal and conservative political camps in South Korea and top leaders’ fear of regime instability and nuclear development in North Korea—weakened centripetal forces. Whether and how effectively the Koreans will be able to influence the operation of these five factors will probably affect the likelihood of peaceful reunification significantly in the future.

Introduction: Japan, the great powers, and the coordination of North Korea policy Linus Hagstrom and Marie Soderberg 1. Japan and the recurrent nuclear crisis Tsuneo Akaha 2. The rationales behind North Korean foreign policy Han S. Park 3. Seoul's policy toward Pyongyang: Strategic culture and the negligibility of Japan Balbina Y. Hwang 4. US North Korea policy: The 'Japan factor' Yoichiro Sato 5. Chinese North Korea policy: A secondary role for Japan Quansheng Zhao 6. Russian North Korea policy: Old conflicts obstacle for Russo-Japanese cooperation Alexander Zhebin 7. The EU's North Korea policy: No trace of Japanese influence Rudiger Frank 8. Japan and multilateralism in the North Korean nuclear crisis: Road map or dead end? Christopher W. Hughes

This study discusses about Kim Jong Un’s idiosyncratic impact in North Korea's foreign policy related to the escalation of the conflict in the Korean Peninsula in 2013. The background of this research is the change of North Korea’s foreign policy in the leadership era of Kim Jong Un which decided to re-confrontation with South Korea. Those became the main platform issues examined in this research, which is why North Korea under the leadership era of Kim Jong Un decided to re-confrontation with South Korea in 2013. Those problem will be analyzed and explaned by using idiosyncratic theory, authoritarian leadership and decision making as the basic argument. Based on the theoretical approach that given, it can be deduced that the escalation of the conflict in the Korean Peninsula in 2013 was effected by idiosyncratic of Kim Jong Un that describes the characteristics of Kim Jong Un is dictatorial. Thus, the holder of the power taken by Kim Jong Un so that can be affect the decision making of Kim Jong Un and produce a confrontational North Korea’s policy. Key words: Foreign Policy, Idiosyncratic, Authoritarian Leadership, Decision Making

Background The central model of Japan’s North Korea policy has been maintained consistently despite repeated changes in the government from the Liberal Democratic Party to the Democratic Party and back again.Purpose: This paper summarizes Japan’s policy concerning North Korea after the Cold War, examines the structure of this policy, and, based on this structure, analyzes Japan’s current policy regarding North Korea. The analysis then turns to the future.Main Argument: Normalizing relations between Japan and North Korea may be the primary goal of Japan’s policy, but the following four motives can also be identified. First, for Japan, the normalization of relations with North Korea is significant as a remaining postwar process. The second motive involves responses to security issues. Third, there is the issue of the safety of Japanese lives. Fourth, Japan’s economic opportunities in North Korea must be considered. Japan has sought ties with North Korea with these four motives, which will remain unchanged in the future. However, Japan does not aim to normalize relations with North Korea without restrictions, and Japan’s policy concerning North Korea is bound by the following three factors. The first factor is the international environment. Second, Japan–North Korea relations are constrained by the attitude of South Korea. Third, Japan’s domestic politics also determine Japan’s North Korea policy.Conclusion: While the four motives will remain the same for Japan, these three factors determine Japan’s attitude toward North Korea, all three of which are pushing for Japan to negotiate with North Korea. He central model of Japan’s North Korea policy has been maintained consistently despite repeated changes in the government from the Liberal Democratic Party to the Democratic Party and back again. This paper summarizes Japan’s policy concerning North Korea after the Cold War, examines the structure of this policy, and, based on this structure, analyzes Japan’s current policy regarding North Korea. The analysis then turns to the future. Normalizing relations between Japan and North Korea may be the primary goal of Japan’s policy, but the following four motives can also be identified. First, for Japan, the normalization of relations with North Korea is significant as a remaining postwar process. The second motive involves responses to security issues. Third, there is the issue of the safety of Japanese lives. Fourth, Japan’s economic opportunities in North Korea must be considered. Japan has sought ties with North Korea with these four motives, which will remain unchanged in the future. However, Japan does not aim to normalize relations with North Korea without restrictions, and Japan’s policy concerning North Korea is bound by the following three factors. The first factor is the international environment. Second, Japan–North Korea relations are constrained by the attitude of South Korea. Third, Japan’s domestic politics also determine Japan’s North Korea policy. While the four motives will remain the same for Japan, these three factors determine Japan’s attitude toward North Korea, all three of which are pushing for Japan to negotiate with North Korea.

IntroductionThe denuclearization of North Korea (officially, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or DPRK) has been most important policy objective in U.S.-North Korea relations since end of Cold War. But U.S. foreign policy in North Korea proved unsuccessful when Pyongyang conducted its first nuclear test in 2006. Both William J. Clinton administration (1993-2000) and George W. Bush administration (2001-2008) sought to prevent a nuclear North Korea by adopting a ety of toward country, ranging from a possible use of military force to a negotiated settlement. Despite many years of hard work, however, their efforts failed.President Obama has been seeking denuclearization of North Korea since his inauguration in 2009. Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and counterterrorism are top priorities in his foreign policy. Like his predecessors, Obama also believes that nuclear nonproliferation is critical not only security of United States, but also peace of international community. On April 5, 2009, he revealed his vision a world without nuclear weapons in Prague, Czech Republic.1 Approximately one year later, Obama administration also announced a radical shift in U.S. nuclear weapons strategy in that United States will not use its nuclear weapons to retaliate against attacks involving biological or chemical weapons or large- scale conventional forces.2 On April 8, 2010, he also signed a historic nuclear arms control treaty with Russian president Dmitri A. Medvedev.3 He was even awarded 2009 Nobel Peace Prize for his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples.4However, Obama has not been so successful with North Korean nuclear issue. Since Obama administration adopted a policy, no progress has been made: neither denuclearization process nor Six-Party Talks have resumed. Pyongyang even conducted a second nuclear test during Obama's term, and has not rejoined Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).The central goal of this paper is to explain why Obama administration has not had any noticeable accomplishment in its policy on North Korean nuclear issue. By closely examining policy goals and strategies of Obama administration over past two and a half years, this paper seeks to uncover what is missing from U.S. policy toward North Korea. The starting point is to make sense of what Pyongyang really wants from Washington. Giving due consideration to Pyongyang's objectives, President Obama faces a choice of three different strategies: coercive diplomacy, strategic patience (the status quo), and engagement.This paper argues that success of Obama administration in achieving denuclearization of North Korea is dependent on an appropriate understanding of Pyongyang's security concerns and a careful analysis of North Korean nuclear policy. It suggests that President Obama should radically change his North Korea policy. More specifically, he should abandon strategic patience policy and instead adopt a constructive engagement policy in order to achieve denuclearization of North Korea and security of East Asian region.The North Korea Policy of Obama AdministrationPresident Barack Obama was expected to bring about dramatic change in not only U.S. domestic policy but also foreign policy. These expectations were incredibly high, both because Obama symbolized change as first African American president in American history and because he retained political power to do so with Democratic Party's control of both chambers of Congress. The inauguration of President Obama also generated expectations in Pyongyang that the strained relationship between North Korea and U.S. would improve under new U.S. administration, Obama had indicated during 2008 presidential campaign his willingness to meet even with leaders of rogue nations, such as Kim Jong-Il of North Korea, if that was what it would take to resolve North Korean nuclear issue. …

China’s policy of restraint (avoidance of crippling economic sanctions) towards North Korean provocation is typically explained in terms of geopolitical concern with North Korean regime stability. The strategic and diplomatic costs of restraint would suggest the presence of non-geopolitical influences behind China’s approach. Ideational explanations emphasise the persistence of shared socialist identity as well as the traditional Sino-centric worldview as shaping influences. There is much less detailed analysis of how China views North Korea’s political economic evolution and how this view has changed over time to produce fluctuations in the bilateral relationship. In order to capture China’s motivations more fully, I introduce two additional variables, namely China’s view of the state of its own reform path (which provides the domestic context shaping policy towards North Korea), and the extent of North Korea’s readiness to prioritise economic reform. I will then use these variables to explain two contrasting phases which represented the worst (1992–1999) and best (2009–2012) of times in the bilateral relationship in the post-Cold War era. These variables also help us to understand the potentials and limitations of the upturn in bilateral relations which has occurred since 2018.

OverviewThe tension on the Korean Peninsula decreased immediately following the dramatic reconciliation, in June 2000, between Kim Il-Sung, former leader of North Korea, and Kim Dae-jung, president of South Korea. President Kim Dae-jung adopted a policy of engagement toward North Korea called the Policy. Subsequent to President Kim Dae-jung's five-year rule, President Ro Moo Hyun inherited the engagement policy from his predecessor. Under the Sunshine Policy, South Korea provided North Korea with generous economic aid on an annual basis from 1998 to 2007.At the beginning of 2008, South Korea switched from a one-way engagement policy to a policy of give-and-take. South Korea's new president, Lee Myung Bak, inaugurated in February 2008, initiated this policy shift. President Lee came to believe that South Korea's engagement policy had failed. In February 2009, Barack Obama was inaugurated as the 44th president of the U.S.Under the Clinton administration, the U.S. attempted to settle disputes through direct dialogue with North Korea. It is reasonable to assume therefore that under the Obama regime, more of a direct dialogue between North Korea and the U.S. may be pursued to resolve pending issues, including North Korea's development of weapons of mass destruction and support of rogue terrorist states.North Korea has been excessively provocative in recent years. On October 9, 2006, North Korea test-launched a nuclear missile. Neighboring countries immediately expressed serious concern, and the U.S. nuclear envoy, Christopher Hill, doubled his efforts to ensure that North Korea fulfill its agreements on denuclearization through the Six-Party Talks countries; namely, South Korea, North Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and the U.S. North Korea agreed to disable the Yongbyon nuclear reactor and to dismantle nuclear facilities in the interest of nonproliferation. The international community is watching closely to determine whether North Korea will fulfill its obligations under these agreements. Kim Jong-il has to decide whether he will take further steps to put North Korea in the nuclear power club-which would be likely to invite furious resistance from the Western world-or opt instead to abandon the nuclear program to improve international relations.The purpose of this paper is to envisage President Obama's North Korea policy by applying game theory. In game theory, players try to adopt the best strategy, given their objective function. There have been six major players so far in the Korean Peninsula's nuclear conflict. We point out that interstate differences in the objectives between the national leaders and the party/military leaders have undermined the Six-Party Talks.This paper focuses on the game play between North Korea and the U.S. Although Kim Jong-il can effectively control his military advisers at present, there are potential divergences in their respective viewpoints, which may become more evident in the future.The Game Play in Economic Cooperation between South Korea and North KoreaIn June 2000, Kim Dae-jung of South Korea and Kim Jong-il of North Korea met for the first time to ease the tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Since this meeting, the two Koreas have expanded the scope of reconciliation and economic cooperation. The two countries agreed on the reunion of separated families, the establishment of an industrial complex in Kaesong, and the joint exploration of Kumgang Mountain as a means of promoting tourism. This honeymoon abruptly ended when North Korea fired two nuclear missiles on October 9, 2006. During the period 2000-06, President Kim Dae-jung and his successor President Roh Moo-hyun implemented the engagement policy of reconciliation toward North Korea. With generous economic aid from South Korea, North Korea was able to overcome severe food and energy shortages. In return, North Korea opened Kumgang Mountain to South Koreans, and allowed South Korean businesses to hire lower-wage workers in the Kaesong industrial complex. …

Conceptual mappings in political cartoons: A comparative study of the case of nuclear crises in US–North Korean relations

The Trump–Kim Summit in Singapore can be regarded as a meaningful first step in a long journey towards complete denuclearisation of North Korea. At the Singapore summit, President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un agreed that North Korea would denuclearise completely and that the United States would in return provide North Korea with security guarantees. However, due to political complexity of the North Korean nuclear issue and technical difficulties of nuclear dismantlement, the process towards complete denuclearisation of North Korea is expected to be protracted and difficult. The prospects for future US–North Korea nuclear negotiations will largely depend on how both countries can work out together the concrete steps, phases and timelines for the implementation of denuclearisation.

This article examines North Korea's policy toward Japan in the 1980s and prospects for policy changes in the 1990s. The author describes the generally negative images that Japan and North Korea held of each other in the 1980s, including a pattern of sanctions and countermeasures. The beginning of a more favorable DPRK policy toward Japan in the 1980s is also revealed. The author examines the personnel who have been and may reasonably be expected to continue to be influential in making DPRK-Japan policy, as he traces the growing independence of that policy from the North's South Korea policy. Finally the author presents recent North Korean actions that suggest a growing desire to improve relations with Japan.

The structural dynamics of the Korean conflict has evolved not only with the inter-Korean rivalry, but also the geopolitics of great power rivalries. The conflict structure was reinforced going through the Korean War and the Cold War. There have been several South Korean initiatives to build peace with North Korea in the post-Cold War era, however the peace process fluctuated due to the escalation of the US-North Korean conflict over the nuclear and missile development of North Korea, and the dispute over North Korea policy in the South Korean society. Building on the sociological understanding of ‘duality of structure’ and the biological insight of ‘niche construction’, this article demonstrates the South Korean potential, as a democratic state, to construct a niche space for its citizens’ peacebuilding with North Korea under the ongoing Korean conflict structure, as well as its limitations in protecting the space before scaling out the disruption of the conflict structure, when governments do not have a clear sense of agency about their policy due to the lack of consensus among its citizens.