Abstract
Naive implementation of block ciphers are subject to side-channel and fault injection attacks. To deceive side-channel attacks and to detect fault injection attacks, the designer inserts specially crafted error correcting codes in the implementation. The impact of codes on protection against fault injection attacks is well studied: the number of detected faults relates to their minimum distance. However, regarding side-channel attacks, the link between codes and protection efficiency is blurred. In this paper, we relate statistical properties of code-based countermeasures against side-channel attacks to their efficiency in terms of security, against uni- and multi-variate attacks.
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