Statistical evidence and surprise unified under possibility theory

Abstract

AbstractSander Greenland argues that reported results of hypothesis tests should include the surprisal, the base‐2 logarithm of the reciprocal of a p‐value. The surprisal measures how many bits of evidence in the data warrant rejecting the null hypothesis. A generalization of surprisal also can measure how much the evidence justifies rejecting a composite hypothesis such as the complement of a confidence interval. That extended surprisal, called surprise, quantifies how many bits of astonishment an agent believing a hypothesis would experience upon observing the data. While surprisal is a function of a point in hypothesis space, surprise is a function of a subset of hypothesis space. Satisfying the conditions of conditional min‐plus probability, surprise inherits a wealth of tools from possibility theory. The equivalent compatibility function has been recently applied to the replication crisis, to adjusting p‐values for prior information, and to comparing scientific theories.