Abstract
Philosophers who find the concept of a state of nature to be useful for thinking about moral and political issues have generally assumed that such a state can be understood in either a Hobbesian or a Lockean way, but not both. Hobbesian and Lockean states of nature are thought to be mutually incompatible in the sense that the empirical generalizations and normative claims associated with the constructs differ, and cannot simultaneously be true. This belief about mutual incompatibility is mistaken, if not as a matter of textual exegesis, then as an interpretation of the normative concepts philosophers have inherited from the works of Hobbes and Locke. We do not need to reach any new insights about what either Hobbes or Locke really meant to see the mistake. However Hobbes or Locke understood the meaning and significance of a state of nature within their more comprehensive accounts, the broadly Lockean and Hobbesian concepts of a state of nature continue to be enormously influential on contemporary moral and political philosophy. Recognizing the mutual compatibility of these two concepts has important normative implications for both subjects. If the states of nature are not mutually exclusive, then some persons could be in a Hobbesian state of nature while other persons are in a Lockean state of nature. Furthermore, a person could be in a Hobbesian state of nature in relation to some
Published Version
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