Statements, Facts and the Correspondence Theory of Truth

Abstract

The Correspondence Theory of Truth (referred to throughout this chapter as ‘the Theory’) has assumed many different forms since Aristotle, developing an argument in Plato’s Sophist, first brought it to the forefront of the debate about the nature of truth. Much of the controversy surrounding the Theory has arisen because its advocates and opponents have had different ideas about what it is that is supposed to correspond to or with what. The uncertainty — sometimes a matter of conscious disagreement but more often one merely of confusion — extends to both ends of the correspondence. Is the correspondence between, say, statements and states of affairs, or between perceptions and things, or between thoughts and things, or what? Various permutations are possible, generating numerous variants of the theory. Almost any X may be said to correspond to almost any Y: When, as has often been the case, it is unclear which variant is being advocated or denied, well-heated but poorly illuminated argument is inevitable. In some versions, the Theory applies to knowledge or perception; in others, it is about statements, Even where it is made clear that the version of the Theory under discussion is about the truth of statements — rather than of, say, percepts or beliefs — ambiguity about its scope may remain.KeywordsTrue StatementFactual StatementMaterial ObjectImplicit PredicationCorrespondence TheoryThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.