Russell’s Unpublished Writings on Truth and Denoting

Abstract

adopted from Meinong. But following this discussion which issues in the conclusion that 'the present king of France is bald' is neither true nor false because there is no king of France, Russell quickly raises a doubt: Can we extend the above theory to all false propositions? Are these all complex concepts which denote nothing? Consider (say) "Shakespeare was bUnd". Here there is not a failure of denotation in the parts, as in "the author of the IUad was bUnd". But it may be said that there is a failure of denotation in the whole; that the phrase should denote Shakespeare's blindness, and that there is no such entity. This is a difficult question; it shall be left open at present. 6 ICf. B. Russell, "On Denoting", 14: Mind, Oct. 1905, 479-93. 2p.F. Strawson, "On Referring", Mind, S9: July 19S0, 320-44. 3Cf. B. Russell, Autobiography (Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brown, 196]), I, 269-]1. 4There is a group of three papers, all unpubl ished and all written at approximately the same time (before "On Denoting"): "Points about Denoting ", 18 pages; "On the Meaning and Denotati"on of Phrases", 22 pages; and "On Mean i ng and Denotat ion", 99 pages. In the first of these Russell refers to Combes as the Prime l1inister of France, and Combes held that office only until 18 January, 1905. 5"On the Meaning and Denotation of Phrases", pp.S-6. 6Ibid., p.6. 7"Points about Denoting", p.S. B"On the Meaning and Denotation of Phrases", p.6. 9"The Nature of Truth" (unpublished), p.7a. Throughout nearly the whole of his philosophical career, Russell maintained a correspondence theory of truth: the proposition expressed by a sentence is true if it 'corresponds' with some 'fact', and false if it does not: A proposition purports to denote a certain fact and is true if it does so denote, false if it does not. He writes, •... a true proposition denotes a fact, which a false one denotes nothing. 1I7 Both 'Shakespeare was blind' and 'the author of the Ili"ad was blind' make existential claims. And in both cases the claim is false owing to a failure of denotation. Therefore, concluded Russell, if the one proposition is neither true nor false, so must the other be as well. But this is intolerable, since 'Shakespeare was blind' is clearly false. Thus, Russel I says, ·If we decide that in all false propositions there is a failure of denotation, we shal} say that truth and falsehood attach to meanings, not denotations." B This, however, would force Russell to abandon his correspondence theory of truth. Not wishing to abandon that theory, Russell returned to the position advocated in the Principles; and in a paper dated June 1905 he says: " ... we must admit that there are entities which do not exist".9 But he did not long remain satisfied with this view, and in the margin of the paper he penciled in "Rewrite". Soon after this, it must have been, he discovered the now classic theory of descriptions, which ended his commitment to subsistent entities and, at the same time, preserved his correspondence theory of truth. According to the theory of descriptions, as presented in "On Denoting", the proposition expressed by 'the present king of France is bald' is logically equivalent to the proposition expressed by 'there exists one and only individual such that he is the present king of France, and this individual is bald'. Russel/'s Unpublished Writings on Truth and Denoting It is clear from his correspondence that Russell was very hurt in his later years by the comparati"ve neglect into which his philosophy had fallen. In particular, the theory of descriptions,l which for nearly half a century seemed unassai"lable and was regarded by many as Russell's finest phi"losophical achi"evement, was partially ecl ipsed in his own lifetime by the work of Strawson. 2 Russell was never able to see any merit in Strawson's proposals, and replied to him in My philosophical Development. Having written the reply, Russell wrote as follows to Ayer: Could you tell me one thing? I have always been aurious as to...