STATE TAX PREFERENCE ORDERINGS AND PARTISAN CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT

Abstract

ABSTRACTUsing scattered analyses linking partisan control of political institutions to taxation decisions as the point of departure, this paper examines patterns of tax preferences in American States. Focusing on the order in which states enacted personal income taxes, general sales taxes, and corporation income taxes, several important patterns emerge. First, states with both the governorship and state legislature traditionally controlled by members of the same political party showed a strong tendency to prefer a corporation income tax and a personal income tax together as a first preference, followed by a general sales tax. Second, partisan competition and divided institutional control seemed to constitute a modest impediment to taxation of personal incomes as a high priority. And third, the nature of the partisan culture did not seem to facilitate or impede high preference for either general sales taxes or corporation income taxes to the extent found for personal income taxation. The implication is that where there is traditionally a high degree of partisan competitiveness and fragmentation, personal income taxation is likely to be accorded rather low preferences relative to other taxes.