State Legislative Response to Direct Democracy and the Politics of Partial Compliance

Abstract

Over the last quarter-century, direct democracy has played an increasingly important role in state politics and policy. While limited attitudinal data show high levels of legislative approval for direct democracy, the most prominent piece of behavioral scholarship concludes that California legislators often attempt to steal the initiative by displacing ballot measure content and preventing full implementation. Results from an original web survey indicate that Oregon lawmakers are cautiously supportive of the initiative process and identify the conditions under which they support changes to voter-ratified bills. Case study evidence shows how legislators use their power to amend successful initiatives to clarify and improve flawed measures. I argue that institutional rules governing the initiative amendment process in Oregon allow legislators to engage in partial compliance while preserving voters core ideas. By drawing on new data sources and analyzing both behavior and attitudes, the findings shed new light on when, how, and under what conditions state government actors interfere in the initiative process and offer an important correction to the literature on legislative response to direct democracy.