Abstract
This paper challenges several approaches in the literature to remedying the relative economic weakness of cities within urban areas featuring numerous local governments. It suggests that the approaches suggested by several schools of scholars - including the Regionalists and New Regionalists - rely on politically unrealistic assumptions regarding the operations of local political institutions. In light of the often coextensive economic and political weakness of cities, it is likely that innovative thinking will be necessary if inequalities in local service provision are to be mitigated. In addition to describing the factors that create leverage in interlocal negotiations, the paper also includes a simple, descriptive game theoretic model of county-city bargaining and applies it to the important case study of the revenue-sharing agreement between Charlottesville and Albemarle County, Virginia. The criticisms made of the political implausibility of the existing approaches in the literature highlight the importance of finding creative solutions to the municipal problem. One such solution may be the use of certain kinds of centralized redistribution of funds as a palliative for interlocal wealth disparities that can maintain greater political support than state laws that enhance city power. A state-administered system that requires contributions from jurisdictions in proportion to the extent that each jurisdiction’s tax base exceeds the state average may help a majority of jurisdictions by mitigating the “race to the bottom” of tax base competition and thereby maintain political support.
Published Version
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