State and Society in China's Democratic Transition: Confucianism, Leninism, and Economic Development (review)

Abstract

Reviewed by: State and Society in China's Democratic Transition: Confucianism, Leninism, and Economic Development Robert E. Gamer (bio) Guo Xiaoqin . State and Society in China's Democratic Transition: Confucianism, Leninism, and Economic Development. New York: Routledge, 2003. xi, 270 pp. Hardcover $85.00, ISBN 0-415-94504-6 As the title implies, this book assesses the impact of Confucianism, Leninism, and the success of the Chinese communist regime in achieving economic development on the attitudes of Chinas intelligentsia, political opposition, private entrepreneurial classes, and ordinary people. The attitudes of all of these groups have contributed to a strong state, a weak society, and an economic development imperative. But together can they bring about democratic transition? The book is based on several months of interviews in the summer of 2000 by the author, Guo Xiaoqin, with ninety-nine government officials, intellectuals, entrepreneurs, and ordinary people in Beijing, Hong Kong, and along the Yangtze River. The jobs and locations of those interviewed, and the questions asked, appear in the appendix. The author sought individuals from many walks of life, and intellectuals who both supported and opposed the Tiananmen demonstrations. He found that bureaucrats are inclined to support top-down development rather than democracy, although lower-level officials "tend to be less satisfied with [End Page 436] the status quo because they have less stake in the system" (p. 13). Although supporters of the Tiananmen demonstrations who still live in China support democracy, they also support the Party's reformers and are wary of giving too much power to the less-educated masses. Exiled dissidents have isolated themselves from China's people and public opinion. The newly rich maintain close networks with public officials and will support the status quo as long as they benefit from it. In general, the author found economic development and political stability to supersede democratic reform as priorities. He concludes that none of the groups mentioned will take real action to bring about democracy (p. 17). Instead, they count on the country's leaders to initiate democratization, slowly, during the first fifty or more years of the twenty-first century. That is because of an image shared by many interviewed that democracy is a historical trend accompanying economic development, that the leadership will press for further reforms, and that political reform will be a means to fight political corruption (although most officials are good and fair). The interviews took place at the height of Zhu Rongji's attack on political corruption, which interviewees applauded. Underlying all this support for the regime is the perception that communist rule has survived the Tiananmen unrest and has entered the twenty-first century with great success. Much of that success emanates from effective political control over an effective bureaucracy during the post-Mao era. This has not only saved the bureaucracy from developing fatigue but has convinced others in society that the regime can maintain political stability and dynamic economic development. That analysis conflicts with those who argue that China is developing "fragmented authoritarianism" with "divided, segmented, and stratified chains of command," and also with those who maintain that authority lies in the hands of a few top Party leaders. In matters of personnel, ideology, public security, and foreign affairs, authority does lie at the top; control over the economy is diversified (p. 21). Confucianism has contributed to this with its emphasis on the moral imperative of rule by educated generalist career administrators who have autonomy yet maintain unswerving loyalty to their superiors, on familiar terms with one another and the central leaders—so long as the country experiences unity and stability. Leninism contributes the notion that the Party should lay down the guidelines implemented by the government and wage class struggle through mass movements. Deng Xiaoping relaxed some of these controls, emphasizing rapid economic growth under a strong state committed to maintaining stability and continued management of the economy where needed. He replaced some personalized power with collective decision making, separated some of the activities of Party and government, instituted elections for local government, and transferred some power to provincial, city, and township governments. Guo takes issue both with scholars who see the new technocratic bureaucrats rejecting the old ways...