Abstract

Safeguards measures are employed at nuclear reactor facilities worldwide, to ensure that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful uses. Typical safeguards measures involve periodic inspections, off-line verification and video surveillance of fuel cycle activities. Real-time verification of the fissile contents via stand-off monitoring can enhance continuity of knowledge for non-traditional reactor types, including research reactors and small modular reactors. Here we demonstrate the feasibility of using large-area neutron detectors for monitoring nuclear reactors at stand-off distances up to 100 m outside reactor shielding, as a potential reactor safeguards tool. Since the neutron yield per unit reactor power depends upon the isotopic composition of the reactor core, declared changes in fissile composition can be verified without accessing the core. The supporting results of experiments conducted at the National Research Universal reactor in Canada, are presented.

Highlights

  • Safeguards measures are employed at nuclear reactor facilities worldwide, to ensure that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful uses

  • The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) uses nuclear reactor safeguards measures to verify that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful uses[1]

  • The technique of stand-off reactor monitoring using neutron detection is based upon the fact that the number of neutrons detected ndet, is proportional to the population of neutrons npop in the reactor core, ndet where [n cm−2 s−1] is the average neutron flux in the reactor core, [cm s−1] is the average speed of the neutrons in the reactor core, and V [cm3] is the volume of the reactor core

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Summary

Introduction

Safeguards measures are employed at nuclear reactor facilities worldwide, to ensure that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful uses. The IAEA has stated in its 2012–2023 Long-Term R&D Plan for its Department of Safeguards that it is a high priority to “develop instruments and associated techniques to detect the establishment of nuclear fuel cycle activities, for example by detecting process emanations”[4]. Such technologies can provide real-time additional information for verification of nuclear reactor fuel cycle activities, including cores of research reactors and other SMRs. A prominent emanation from fission nuclear reactors are neutrons. The economical aspect of using neutron detectors for the purpose of reactor safeguards means that it should be feasible to employ an array of detectors at different locations around a reactor, with coordinated detection signals such as to discriminate against either inadvertent or malicious interferences that might cause variations in individual neutron detection rates

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