Staging Chinese Revolution: Theater, Film, and the Afterlives of Propaganda by Xiaomei Chen

While Mao Zedong might still be China's most famous communist, only scholars of the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have heard of Wang Jiaxiang and even they have never studied his career in detail. But recent Chinese publications show that there were very few CCP leaders who had such a tremendous impact on the Chinese communist movement in general and Mao Zedong's career in particular. This article will show that Wang not only supported Mao during the power struggles of the 1930s and helped convince Stalin that Mao should be acknowledged as the CCP's leader, but that Wang also played a decisive role in establishing Mao Zedong-Thought as the Party's guiding ideology. The release of numerous Party documents in the last five years also throws some light upon the relations and conflicts between Mao Zedong and other CCP leaders such as Wang Ming, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Guotao and Liu Shaoqi in the decade between the Long March and the Seventh Party Congress of 1945.

Reviewed by: Zhou Enlai: The Enigma Behind Chairman Mao by Michael Dillon Yafeng Xia (bio) Michael Dillon. Zhou Enlai: The Enigma Behind Chairman Mao. London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2020. xi, 302 pp. Paperback $29.95, isbn 978-178-831-930-0. Among several books in English on the late Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai (who served from 1949 to 1976), two stand out. The first, by Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen, “explores the nature of” Zhou’s political behavior and assesses how such behavior affected twentieth-century Chinese history.1 The second, by former senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) historian Gao Wenqian, which is based on classified party documents and personal interviews with high-level party officials, provides a revisionist account of Zhou Enlai. This volume is an abridged English translation of Gao’s Wannian Zhou Enlai (Zhou Enlai’s Later Years), which, having been adapted for Western readers, includes the stories of Zhou’s earlier years prior to the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) and elaborates the political context of the Cultural Revolution and the behavior of other actors (chapters 2–7, pp. 21–104).2 Relying primarily on Chinese sources supplemented with writings by Western journalists who visited CCP bases during the War of Resistance against Japan and foreign diplomats stationed in Beijing in the 1950s and the 1960s, Michael Dillon presents a sympathetic account of Zhou’s life from his birth in 1898 to his death in 1976 in twenty-three chapters. This is a standard biography of Zhou, covering his childhood, education, upbringing, personality, political activism, and revolutionary activities, presenting a thorough picture of Zhou the diplomat and statesman. Dillon argues, “This private side of Zhou Enlai is one [End Page 263] of the reasons why he became the world’s favorite Chinese Communist, but Zhou’s character was complex” (p. viii). According to Dillon, Zhou “was a statesman rather than simply a political operator and achieved much on the international stage” (p. ix). But scholars on Zhou Enlai and the history of the CCP will not be pleased, as the book does not add much to what they have already known about Zhou. To correctly understand and evaluate Zhou’s historical role in the Chinese Communist movement and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), it is crucial that we correctly understand Zhou’s relationship with Mao Zedong, the CCP Chairman and China’s paramount leader from 1949 to 1976. The reviewer cannot agree with several of Dillon’s major assertions, such as, “Zhou had remained personally close to Mao, never criticized him in public, and was himself never criticized openly :: : . Eventually he was attacked, viciously but covertly, by Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing” (p. 264). I feel that the author is unfamiliar with some of the new findings on Zhou Enlai that have been revealed in the last two decades. In the following paragraphs, I try to set the record straight. The relationship between Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong has attracted much scholarly attention, and it is a key issue in our understanding of Chinese politics in the late 1960s and early 1970s. There are three popular models of the relationship: Zhou was a faithful follower of Mao; Zhou was a puppet of Mao; and Zhou was a moderating force on Mao, which is the version the official Chinese Communist historiography promotes.3 Dillon falls into the third model, as he writes, “During the Great Leap and particularly the Cultural Revolution, Zhou was in an impossible position. To survive, he said and did things he would have preferred not to. By surviving, he ensured a degree of damage limitation and protected many friends and colleagues” (p. 270). For years, Zhou was “the Beloved People’s Premier,” a sensitive and effective administrator and a moderating force in the PRC’s politics. He was good-looking, urbane, brilliant, and a master diplomat. He always valued the nation’s needs above his own. He managed to save hundreds of purged officials during the Cultural Revolution. But Gao Wenqian turns the tables on Zhou. According to Gao, Zhou was a tragic backroom schemer, a puppet of his master Mao, and a man who so rigorously observed a...

Between 1949 and 1976, under Mao Zedong’s 毛泽东 leadership, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) implemented socialist economic policies. In the 1950s, the central planning of industry (with an emphasis on heavy industry) was introduced, modeled on the five-year plans of the Soviet Union, and agriculture was collectivized. Following the collapse of the Great Leap Forward and the political split with Moscow, China’s economic policies in the 1960s and 1970s vacillated between Mao’s ultraleftist tendencies and more conventional socialist policies advocated by such leaders as Liu Shao-ch’i 刘少奇 and Deng Xiaoping 邓小平. Mao attacked his opponents for taking the capitalist road and largely succeeded in suppressing their proposed policies until his death in 1976. After Mao’s death, advocacy of various reforms became more acceptable. One important early sign of the new atmosphere was the announcement in 1977 that entrance examinations for China’s universities (which had been attacked and closed down during the Cultural Revolution) would be reestablished. Deng Xiaoping returned to power, and at the Third Plenum (of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP) in December 1978 the famous four-character policy gaige kaifang (改革开放), a reform of the economic system and an opening up to the outside world, was promulgated. Beyond the strong signal that the reforms were intended to remedy some of Mao’s mistakes, it was not clear exactly what the slogan would entail in practice. Indeed, even in the early 21st century the specifics of the reforms are still the subject of substantial disagreements within the CCP leadership. However, there can be no doubt that the reforms since 1978 generally have succeeded in both the system reform aspect, marked by the decollectivization of agriculture and the dismantling of Soviet-style central planning in industry, and the opening-up aspect, leading to China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. It is also beyond doubt that the reforms have resulted in rapid economic growth (by the official statistics, an average annual growth of real gross domestic product of 9.7 percent between 1980 and 2009). However, it is also true that in the early 21st century many Chinese people remain desperately poor, and the reforms continue to be incomplete and controversial.

Throughout the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), disagreement has existed concerning the extent to which Chinese Communism might be considered authentically Marxist. In general, most of the available literature tends to simply accept the Chinese Communist self-identification as Marxist. No binding consensus among independent Sinologists, however, is found and resistance has taken on a variety of forms throughout the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—some partisan and some genuinely analytic. The academic literature produced during the entire period of CCP rule in China has been characterized by wide differences in the acceptance of its Marxist authenticity. It has always been tacitly or explicitly accepted that the Marxism of the CCP at its founding in 1920–1921 was in a form acceptable to the Bolshevik rulers of revolutionary Russia. Having been founded directly through the influence of the Third (or Leninist) International, the CCP had to conform to the Bolshevik interpretation of Marxism. Since Lenin had taken “creative” liberties with the original doctrine, some have maintained that the Marxism of the CCP had never been truly Marxist. To add further difficulty to any analysis of the Marxism of the CCP, it is generally understood that Mao Zedong, who gradually assumed the leadership of the CCP, was not particularly well versed in any variant of Marxism. Over the years and under the pressure of circumstances, Mao delivered varied formulations of his revolutionary ideology. How much those formulations accorded with any variant of Marxism became a matter of interpretation. Some scholars hold that by the time of the “Great Leap Forward,” Mao had devised his own ideology. All of this speculation generated controversy within the CCP leadership. By the time of Mao’s demise in 1976, the doctrine of a “second revolution” animated Deng Xiaoping and his followers. It is still a matter of considerable controversy whether that post-Maoist doctrine, in any sense, is Marxist in content or aspiration.

have risen substantially and that others50 have fallen. The significance of these trends is arguable, but it seems probable that the number of votes received by a Central Committee member reflects his standing both with the top leadership and with the rank and file, except in some cases where it is mainly a mark of esteem for long and faithful work for the party. On the evening of September 28, the day after the adjournment of the congress, the newly elected Central Committee met to elect the new central organs of the party. The results were as follows:51 Chairman of the Central Committee: Mao Tse-tung. Vice-Chairmen: Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Ch'en Yiin. General Secretary. Teng Hsiao-p'ing. Members of the Politburo (17): Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Ch'en Yiin, Teng Hsiaop'ing, Lin Piao, Lin Po-ch'ii, Tung Pi-wu, P'eng Chen, Lo Jung-huan, Chen Yi, Li Fu-ch'un, P'eng Te-huai, Liu Poch'eng, Ho Lung, Li Hsien-nien. Alternate members of the Politburo (6) : Ulanfu, Chang Wen-t'ien, Lu Ting-i, Ch'en Po-ta, K'ang Sheng, Po I-po. Members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo (6): Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Ch'en Yiin, Teng Hsiao-p'ing. Members of the Secretariat of the Central Committee (6) : P'eng Chen, Wang Chia-hsiang, T'an Chen-lin, T'an Cheng, Huang K'o-ch'eng, Li Hslieh-feng. Alternate members of the Secretariat (3) : Liu Lan-t'ao, Yang Shang-k'un, Hu Ch'iao-mu. Members of the Control Commission of the Central Com? mittee (17): Wang Tsung-wu, Wang Wei-chou, Wang Wei-kang, Shuai Meng-chi, Liu Ko-p'ing, Liu Hsi-wu, Liu Lan-t'ao, Li Shih-ying, Li Chu-li, Hsiao Hua, Wu Kaichih, Kao K'o-lin, Kao Yang, Ma Ming-fang, Chang Tingch'eng, Tung Pi-wu, Ch'ien Ying. Alternate members of the Control Commission (4) : Wang Han, Liu Chi-jen, Li Ching-ying, Kung Tzu-jung. Secretary of the Control Commission: Tung Pi-wu. Deputy Secretaries (5) : Liu Lan-t'ao, Hsiao Hua, Wang Tsungwu, Ch'ien ying, Liu Hsi-wu.

have risen substantially and that others50 have fallen. The significance of these trends is arguable, but it seems probable that the number of votes received by a Central Committee member reflects his standing both with the top leadership and with the rank and file, except in some cases where it is mainly a mark of esteem for long and faithful work for the party. On the evening of September 28, the day after the adjournment of the congress, the newly elected Central Committee met to elect the new "central organs" of the party. The results were as follows:51 Chairman of the Central Committee: Mao Tse-tung. Vice-Chairmen: Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Ch'en Yiin. General Secretary. Teng Hsiao-p'ing. Members of the Politburo (17): Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Ch'en Yiin, Teng Hsiaop'ing, Lin Piao, Lin Po-ch'ii, Tung Pi-wu, P'eng Chen, Lo Jung-huan, Chen Yi, Li Fu-ch'un, P'eng Te-huai, Liu Poch'eng, Ho Lung, Li Hsien-nien. Alternate members of the Politburo (6) : Ulanfu, Chang Wen-t'ien, Lu Ting-i, Ch'en Po-ta, K'ang Sheng, Po I-po. Members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo (6): Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Ch'en Yiin, Teng Hsiao-p'ing. Members of the Secretariat of the Central Committee (6) : P'eng Chen, Wang Chia-hsiang, T'an Chen-lin, T'an Cheng, Huang K'o-ch'eng, Li Hslieh-feng. Alternate members of the Secretariat (3) : Liu Lan-t'ao, Yang Shang-k'un, Hu Ch'iao-mu. Members of the Control Commission of the Central Com? mittee (17): Wang Tsung-wu, Wang Wei-chou, Wang Wei-kang, Shuai Meng-chi, Liu Ko-p'ing, Liu Hsi-wu, Liu Lan-t'ao, Li Shih-ying, Li Chu-li, Hsiao Hua, Wu Kaichih, Kao K'o-lin, Kao Yang, Ma Ming-fang, Chang Tingch'eng, Tung Pi-wu, Ch'ien Ying. Alternate members of the Control Commission (4) : Wang Han, Liu Chi-jen, Li Ching-ying, Kung Tzu-jung. Secretary of the Control Commission: Tung Pi-wu. Deputy Secretaries (5) : Liu Lan-t'ao, Hsiao Hua, Wang Tsungwu, Ch'ien ying, Liu Hsi-wu.

It All Hinges on China: Environmental Governance in the Twenty-First Century

Thirty years of reform have brought significant changes not only to the economy but also to the nature of governance and the challenges that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will face in the future. Before the reform program started, policy was decided by a small elite based in Beijing, with Mao Zedong often dominant, and with few alternative sources of information for China’s citizens either with which to assess government performance or to compare China with government performance in other countries. A relatively small percentage of the population was urbanized and a modern middle class was nonexistent. The current situation faced by the CCP is dramatically different with an urban population that exceeds 50 percent, a growing middle class, an economy that is increasingly integrated with global production chains and a population that is networked. This creates new challenges for governance, especially with respect to rising expectations from an increasingly affluent population, and from the challenge of new social media and information flows. The CCP leadership under General Secretary Xi Jinping has clearly identified control over new social media as a significant challenge together with more effectively combatting corruption within the CCP. However, the major factor determining the CCP’s continued rule will rest primarily on its management of the economy, the subject of another paper.

(ProQuest: ... denotes non-USASCII text omitted.) In the contemporary Chinese streetscape, is everywhere. The Chinese rendering of wenming (...),1 has become ubiquitous on poster and billboard advertising, street-side banners and signage, building-mounted plaques and large-character slogans in rural and urban China.2 The volume of literature in China devoted theory is immense. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and academic journals, educational guides, ethics and citizenship handbooks, newspaper articles and websites-particularly since the mid-1990shave carried stories and commentaries covering myriad aspects of the CCP's formulation of what it means be civilized. A formidable Party-state apparatus in the form of Spiritual Civilization Offices and Standing Committees implements the promotion of the narrative at provincial, district and work-unit level. While civilizing discourses as social and governing phenomena in China are receiving increasing scholarly attention, the discursive function of within CCP ideology has not been given the attention that it warrants. Morality campaigns in the post-Mao period have been studied largely as theatres of factional struggle within the CCP leadership and as manifestations of a politicized control balance between social order and economic liberalization. While these campaigns have satisfied various political agendas, they have also been seen as attempts fill the perceived inadequacies of China's moral culture in dealing with the unintended realities of contemporary market reform. For much of the post-Mao era, the promotion of a positive relationship between China's economic and moral health has been effected through the binary framework of the civilizations-material and spiritual civilization.3 From the early 1980s, claiming a genealogy in classical Marxism, the idea of the two civilizations provided an ideologically palatable framework through which the CCP articulated the values necessary achieve balanced development (pinghengde fazhan ...).4 While continued economic growth highlighted gains in civilization, regular morality drives promoting socialist spiritual civilization ostensibly attempted instill within the Chinese citizenry a modern morality robust enough handle the new challenges of the market economy. Such slogans as to grasp with two hands5 reinforced the idea that complimentary progress in both the economic and moral spheres was necessary if China was achieve its developmental ends without losing its soul in the process. The two civilizations became necessary halves of a discursive coin, a unifying narrative representing the management of a multi-layered struggle between economic and moral progress, materialism and ideology, reform and conservatism, globalization and nationalism, cultural dissolution and the positive repackaging of China's cultural traditions. Importantly, the two civilizations proved be a dynamic framework, allowing the promotion of the material and the spiritual alternate, depending on which was considered in vogue at the time. Over most of the post-Mao period this dynamic presented itself as an evolution from an initial emphasis by Deng Xiaoping on material a subsequent emphasis on the spiritual under Jiang Zemin. Furthermore, the meaning and use of spiritual itself was changeable, making it a durable-yet at times contested-concept. Although it represented an active departure from politically configured notions of progress such as class struggle, Deng's spiritual was defined in terminology, while under Jiang Zemin it found expression in the language of cultural nationalism. At the CCP's Sixteenth National Congress in November 2002, however, the twenty-four-year evolution of the two-civilization duality took an altogether unexpected turn with Jiang Zemin's introduction of a third civilization-political civilization. …

Reviewed by: Deng: A Political Biography Dr. David M. Lampton Deng: A Political Biography. By Benjamin Yang. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1998. 331 pp. $59.95 Cloth ($21.95 paper). This is a well-written, insightful book that makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the life, times, and political strategies of Deng Xiaoping. Yang also enlightens the reader about the deeper patterns of Chinese politics and in so doing makes a notable contribution to a growing biographic literature on the last political giant of the twentieth century. A graduate of Beijing University who completed graduate work at Harvard University and subsequently returned to China to teach at People’s University, Yang provides texture to Chinese politics and Deng Xiaoping. This volume and Deng’s daughter’s account of family life in the Deng household provide a sense of a three-dimensional person. Yang’s nuanced image of Deng the politician is captured in a few lines toward the end of the volume: One way to get a fix on Deng is to remember that he was a bridge player. He liked the game, not just as pastime but also, in his own words, as a general exercise of his brain; with a few rules, strict or loose, kept in mind; with a few cards, good or bad, received by chance; with a few quick ideas on how to deliver these cards; with a little cooperation from one’s partner; with an occasional finesse of one’s foes. Win or lose, it’s a game and let’s get on to a new round. The first third of the volume begins with Deng’s childhood in rural Sichuan province and proceeds through his study abroad in France and the Soviet Union in the 1920s; the murky events surrounding his periodic falls from grace in the Chinese Communist Party in the early and mid-1930s; and his relationships with Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Liu Bocheng throughout the almost two decades of anti-Japanese and civil wars of the 1930s and 1940s. The latter two-thirds of the book address Deng’s post-1949 rise to [End Page 217] supreme leader, a process that culminated in his securing power so self-evident that he needed no exalted official position from which to exercise it. Whether it was military strategy and tactics, economic issues, or international affairs, Deng is portrayed as someone far less skilled in the technical aspects of these fields than expert in the art of politics (managing personal relationships and using organizations). The overall image of Deng that emerges is that of an individual adroit in the art of flexibility - opportunities for advancement were to be seized, largely unconstrained by personal loyalties or policy commitments. This portrayal is predictably a far different picture than that painted by Deng’s daughter in her biography of her father. Yang draws appropriate attention to Deng’s actions in the anti-rightist campaign of the late 1950s and the Great Leap disaster that followed into the early 1960s. In painting his picture of Deng Xiaoping, Yang presents a young man who sat at the knee of Zhou Enlai early in his career, hitched his chariot to Mao in the mid-1930s and thereafter (even if occasionally at the expense of Zhou), and at the end of his life seemed to be at the stage of “supreme maturity” where the accumulated lessons of the past could constructively guide policy. The reader only wishes that Yang were able to provide additional insight into how the conclusions Deng drew from his rise to power shaped his exercise of power during the last two decades of his life. But, praiseworthy as the book is in many respects, it also is seriously flawed along one principal dimension. The greatest deficiency is that the author easily slides from adequate documentation and evidence, through marginal documentation and evidence, to absolutely no evidence or documentation. This is a pronounced problem when the author assesses the motivations of Deng and others and speaks with great assurance about their respective political strategies and factional alliances. It is troubling to read some interesting passages and find them documented simply as...

Research Article| January 01 1966 Communist China: A Quiet Crisis in Revolution Michel Oksenberg Michel Oksenberg Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Far Eastern Survey (1937) 6 (1): 1–12. https://doi.org/10.2307/2642254 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Michel Oksenberg; Communist China: A Quiet Crisis in Revolution. Far Eastern Survey 6 January 1937; 6 (1): 1–12. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2642254 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Mao Tse-tung was clearly the unchallenged leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) throughout the 1949-57 period. In this period, broad agreement existed within the CCP leadership on adopting the Soviet model of socialism. The essence of Mao's program for revolution before 1949 had been the need to address Chinese realities, and he was not about to disown that principle during the stage of building socialism. Differences in economic and cultural levels, agricultural patterns, local customs, and ethnic composition all required suitably varied responses. The crucial difference, however, was the degree of CCP presence in various areas before 1949. In addition to gradualism, the common program adopted the classic united front tactic of narrowly defining enemies as 'imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism'. The crucial task for the new liberated areas generally was land reform. To this task the CCP brought experience and personnel that were often lacking for the more complex conditions of the cities.

Politics in China is an authoritative introduction to how the world’s second most populous nation and rapidly rising global power is governed today. Written by leading China scholars, each chapter offers an accessible overview of a key topic in Chinese politics. The opening section provides readers with a firm grounding in China’s modern political history from the fall of the last imperial dynasty to the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the radicalism of the era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), the dramatic economic reforms carried out by Deng Xiaoping and his disciples (1978–2012), and the rise and rule of Xi Jinping (2012–present), who has consolidated more personal power than any CCP leader since Mao. The next section sets the framework of politics in the PRC with chapters on the ideology of the CCP, the structure and dynamics of China’s communist party-state, the role of law and legal reform, and the policies behind the country’s spectacular economic transformation. The book then shifts to a discussion of a series of major political issues in China today: reform and resistance in the countryside; changes and challenges in the cities; the arts and culture; the environment and climate change; public health; population policy; and internet politics. The final chapters of the book cover politics in four important areas located on China’s geographic periphery: Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.

Introduction: A Brief History of Modern Chinese Drama Modern Chinese theatre started at the turn of the twentieth century, in part in response to calls by reform-minded intellectuals unsatisfied with traditional theatre's inability to depict social reality and thus serve political and educational functions. Although missionary schools had staged spoken drama performances in cities such as Shanghai as early as the late 1800s, scholars agree that modern Chinese theatre began in 1907 when the Chinese student group the Spring Willow Society staged in Tokyo an adaptation of Uncle Tom's Cabin titled Black Slave's Cry to Heaven (Heinu yu tian lu). After the fall of the Qing dynasty during the 1911 revolution, new drama moved from Tokyo to Shanghai, where it flourished in a hybrid form known as wenmingxi (civilized drama), which relied heavily on scenarios and improvisation. As a result, few scripts from the era survived. In the late 1910s, the New Culture Movement, known for its attack on traditional culture and aspiration for Western science, democracy, and culture, inspired a new direction in modern Chinese theatre known as huaju (spoken drama). A special issue of the movement's leading magazine New Youth (Xin qingnian) was dedicated to Ibsen and another to dramatic reform. Hu Shi's one-act Greatest Event in Life (Zhongshen dashi, 1919), about the importance of love in marriage, marks the beginning of this huaju dramaturgy. Influenced by modern theatrical movements in Europe, the United States, and Japan, huaju playwrights who had returned from those regions produced plays in a wide variety of styles during the 1920s. Prominent playwrights returning from the United States include Hong Shen, whose Yama Chao (Zhao Yanwang, 1922) used expressionistic techniques; Xiong Foxi (The Artist [Yishujia, 1928] and The Drunkard [Zuile, 1928]); and Yu Shangyuan (Mutiny [Bingbian, 1925]). Returning from Japan in 1922 with a clear understanding of modern Western drama and its Japanese incarnation shingeki (new drama), Tian Han wrote such successful pieces as The Night a Tiger Was Captured (Huohu zhi yiye, 1921), Tragedy on the Lake (Hushang de beiju, 1928), and One Evening in Suzhou (Suzhou yehua, 1929). Ouyang Yuqian, the only original member of the Spring Willow Society still active in theatre, wrote the subversive P'an Jinlian (1928). The English-educated Ding Xilin wrote one-act satires such as Flushed with Wine (Jiuhou, 1925) and Oppression (Yapo, 1926). (1) This diversity of styles took a dramatic turn toward realism and political engagement in the 1930s, first because of Communist-led leftist dramatic movement and then during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). The 1930s also marked huaju's maturity, as best evinced by such classics as Cao Yu's Thunderstorm (Leiyu, 1933) and Xia Yan's Under Shanghai Eaves (Shanghai wuyan xia, 1937). During the war, theatrical activities flourished in three regions: southwestern China, where most theatre artists retreated with the nationalist government; the concession areas of Shanghai; and the Communist-controlled region of Yan'an. One of the better-known styles that flourished in the southwest was the historical play (lishiju), which used allegorical historical figures as oblique criticism of the present situation. The representative playwright in this style was Guo Moruo, who wrote Twin Flowers (Nie Ying, 1920-1941), Qu Yuan (1942), and The Tiger Tally (Hufu, 1942). In the Communist region of Yan'an, Mao Zedong, in his 1942 Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art (Zai Yan'an wenyi zuotanhui shang de jianghua), urged artists to produce works that directly serve the needs of workers, peasants, and soldiers. This resulted in experiments in new theatrical forms more accessible to the masses, including reformed jingju (Beijing opera) plays such as Driven to Revolt (Bishang Liangshan, 1942) and xin geju (new opera) such as The White-Haired Girl (Baimao nu, 1945), which is included in the list. …

A basic uncertainty in China's politics is the transition to the post- Deng era. Deng Xiaoping may hold no formal position of power in the structures of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or the state, but he has remained the undisputed "paramount leader" since the start of the reform era in December 1978. Events since mid- 1989 in both China and the former communist party states of Eastern Europe have foregrounded the prospects of more cataclysmic change, including both the end of CCP rule and political disintegration. The recognition of partial interests is perhaps the most interesting of reforms for a CCP which previously brooked no qualification to its monopoly of political power. The reform process in the USSR demonstrated parallels and lessons to be learnt, and the CCP leadership itself is extremely conscious of the impact developments there may have on the People's Republic of China.