Zhou Enlai: The Enigma Behind Chairman Mao by Michael Dillon

While Mao Zedong might still be China's most famous communist, only scholars of the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have heard of Wang Jiaxiang and even they have never studied his career in detail. But recent Chinese publications show that there were very few CCP leaders who had such a tremendous impact on the Chinese communist movement in general and Mao Zedong's career in particular. This article will show that Wang not only supported Mao during the power struggles of the 1930s and helped convince Stalin that Mao should be acknowledged as the CCP's leader, but that Wang also played a decisive role in establishing Mao Zedong-Thought as the Party's guiding ideology. The release of numerous Party documents in the last five years also throws some light upon the relations and conflicts between Mao Zedong and other CCP leaders such as Wang Ming, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Guotao and Liu Shaoqi in the decade between the Long March and the Seventh Party Congress of 1945.

Reviewed by: China since 1949by Linda Benson Xiaoping Sun (bio) Linda Benson. China since 1949. 2ndedition. Series of Seminar Studies in History. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2011. xliii + 190 pp. Paperback $29.20, isbn978-1-4082-3769-4. From a poor developing country in the mid-twentieth century to an economic powerhouse in the early twenty-first century, China has experienced dramatic changes over the past sixty years. What were the changes and how did they happen? What were their impacts on different sectors of the population? How does the understanding of China’s recent past enrich our appreciation of China’s position in the current world? In this astonishingly concise survey, Linda Benson [End Page 212]tackles these questions felicitously, weaving ordinary people’s lives, particularly of women and ethnic minorities, into major historical events to showcase the many faces, as well as many phases, of China’s political, economic, and social change. Benson centers the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on four major themes: the tension between traditional culture and revolutionary agendas, the disparity between rural and urban development, the uneasiness between regional/local power and central authority, and the tension between Communism and modernization. The unfolding of these tensions, oftentimes intersecting with one another, reveals the complexity of Chinese society undergoing these changes. The book contains three parts, with the first part offering an introduction (chapter 1) and a brief account of the geography and a historical overview focusing on the turbulent years from the late Qing to the 1949 revolution (chapter 2). The second section, chapters 3–10, chronicles major events that shaped recent Chinese society, ranging from political campaigns to economic reforms, from Maoist policies of leaping into a Communist paradise to Hu Jintao’s agenda of building a harmonious world. The last part, chapter 11, concludes the book with assessments of China’s achievements and challenges facing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In two brief chapters (chapters 3 and 4) covering the Mao years from 1949 to 1976, Benson clearly lays out the challenges of the new revolutionary state and attempts of the Communist regime in addressing these challenges. Chapter 3 does a particularly good job of explaining the power structure of the new administration and the relationship between the CCP and the military. The emphasis on land reform, the new marriage law, and the regional autonomous system sets the tone of the book, which gives particular attention to the agricultural sector, women, and minorities. If grouping the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution in one chapter (chapter 4) does support Benson’s claim that “periodization for the book departs from standard treatment in most texts on modern China” (p. 4), the departure actually appears in a simplistic and superficial manner. It makes sense to use the two major political disasters to demonstrate the failures of the radical Maoist attempts, but such treatment overshadows the moderate and yet important changes that helped to salvage China from the turmoil. For example, the reform led by Liu Shaoqi immediately after the three years of famine allowed a rapid economic recovery, and Zhou Enlai, in the early 1970s, had already started to rebuild the CCP and rehabilitate CCP members purged in the Cultural Revolution. Benson’s periodization tends to reproduce the party-line story of a radical transition from political turmoil and economic disaster of Maoist extremes into Deng Xiaoping’s miraculous economic reforms. While Benson’s brevity is admirable, indeed, these two chapters unavoidably fall short by omitting some important aspects of the Mao era that could have better assisted readers to understand the challenges and importance of post-Mao [End Page 213]changes. For example, it is unclear how the rural-based Communist regime established urban order in its early years. Therefore, readers may find it hard to understand how the social and political marks left on the urban landscape by the earlier attempts contribute to the phenomenon of a floating population during the reform era, such as the household registration system instituted in the 1950s and still important today. The rest of the book, chapters 5–10, tells the story of economic reform and social change...

Reviewed by: From Nothing to Nothing: The Chinese Communist Movement and Hong Kong, 1921-1936 Gordon Y. M. Chan (bio) Chan Lau Kit-Ching . From Nothing to Nothing: The Chinese Communist Movement and Hong Kong, 1921-1936. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999. ix, 342 pp. Hardcover $59.95, ISBN 0-312-22428-1. As Professor Chan Lau Kit-Ching aptly observes, Hong Kong's first encounter with Chinese Communism predates July 1, 1997. It has been involved in the Chinese Communist movement ever since the movement's inception in 1921, and for many years before the Communist takeover in 1949 Hong Kong had served as headquarters for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Guangdong. The examination of this previously neglected history promises to shed light on our knowledge of the revolutionary movement not just in the locality of Hong Kong but also in Guangdong and the Chinese nation as a whole (pp. 1-2). Based in Hong Kong, Chan enjoyed a favorable position while exploring this topic. Besides ready access to local archives, both government and private, the proximity of Hong Kong to Guangzhou allowed her to conduct archival research conveniently in the Guangdong Provincial Archives, which hosts the most comprehensive collection of pre-1949 Party documents on Guangdong (including Hong Kong) accessible to both Chinese and foreign historians.1 Furthermore, the Feng Ping Shan Library at the University of Hong Kong has an impressive and expanding acquisition of historical materials on the CCP in Guangdong, published [End Page 412] both publicly and internally in the People's Republic of China (PRC). These resources were within "easy reach" (p. 12) for Chan, who teaches at the University. Given Chan's obvious advantages, the outcome of her research is, however, disappointing. Notwithstanding some shrewd observations, this present work is marred by a marked unfamiliarity with the historiography of the Chinese Communist Revolution. A quick historiographical survey will refute Chan's belief that there is "a dearth of regional studies of the Chinese Communist Movement, especially in the English language" (p. 2). Over the last two decades, Western scholarship has produced intensive studies of the revolution in local contexts,2 although they are predominantly rural in focus. Chan's study could well be a valuable contribution to the underrepresentation of the Chinese Communist urban revolution in the recent literature. Unfortunately, her lack of awareness of many major issues at stake, coupled with her reluctance to discuss the possible implications of her own findings with other scholars in order to enhance our general understanding of the CCP's history, suggests otherwise. The structure of this book is simple. Its four main parts trace the history of the CCP in Hong Kong and Guangdong from 1921 to 1936. The story begins with the small Guangzhou Communism Group that was initiated, in 1921, by Chen Duxiu, together with three Guangdong students he had taught in Beijing who had been exposed to the "new thoughts" of the May Fourth Movement. About a year later, the Socialist Youth League, which was to be superseded by the Communist Youth League in 1925, was established in the province. This organization represented the earliest Communist presence in Hong Kong (the CCP was not founded in the colony until 1924). As a British colony, Hong Kong expectedly exhibited many political and socioeconomic features distinct from those of Guangdong. The awareness of their existence impelled many Hong Kong cadres to ask their superiors on the other side of the border for special treatment and greater autonomy in pursuing revolutionary activities. Several times Chan emphasizes that these appeals mark the initial conception of "one country two systems"—a principle that the PRC employed to resolve the colonial questions of Hong Kong and Macao. The inference drawn here is interesting. Readers should bear in mind, however, that the desire of the regional Party branches for more autonomy based on concerns about their peculiar local conditions was common in the early history of the CCP and was by no means unique to the Communists in Hong Kong.3 Before 1925, Communists had made little headway in Hong Kong; it took the Guangzhou-Hong Kong Strike/Boycott to bolster their position. Because of this...

International negotiations rarely occur under conditions of perfect or completely symmetric information. In the course of pursuing foreign policy, states withhold certain information and intentionally communicate that which is false or misleading. A particularly common instance of incomplete information is that occurring after a change in leadership. When a new government takes office, the nation’s policy positions inevitably undergo a major transition. A change of leadership while a state is conducting prolonged negotiations over long-term issues is likely to change both their trajectory and outcome. The other party concerned in such negotiations is unfamiliar with the new government and its ways, yet historical interaction has made its own circumstances and preferences commonly known to both sides. This is a situation of asymmetric information. The leadership transition of one state frequently arouses suspicions and feelings of insecurity in others, because they have no way of comprehending the actual policy preferences and positions of the new government. Changes in government leadership have engendered several asymmetric information scenarios in the course of contemporary Chinese foreign policy. Around the time the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established, neither the Soviet Union (USSR) nor the major Western powers had any understanding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership. They were suspicious and hesitant, often adopting a wait-and-see stance in their dealings with the new government. Following the Kuomintang (KMT) retreat to Guangzhou, for example, the USSR accordingly moved its Chinese embassy to the Guangdong capital, despite the ostensible bond of communism between the USSR and the Chinese communists. American ambassador to China, John Leighton Stuart is another example. Mao Zedong’s ‘leaning to one side’ concept notwithstanding, Stuart remained in Nanjing, and in August 1949 was prepared to visit the Chinese Communists in Beiping. The US knew too little about the Chinese communist leadership to be sure whether or not to broach a relationship with the new regime. It was in January, 1979, shortly after the Cultural Revolution and at the start of the open door policy, when the western world still knew little about the new generation of CCP leaders, that the Vice Premier of the State Council, Deng Xiaoping, and his wife Zhuo Lin accepted an invitation to a formal

Reviewed by: Mao Zedong and China in the Twentieth-Century World: A Concise History Tina Mai Chen Karl, Rebecca E. – Mao Zedong and China in the Twentieth-Century World: A Concise History. Durham: Duke University Press, 2010. Pp. 216. This remarkable book accomplishes what few other succinct accounts of major historical figures are able to do. In readable prose that is both accessible to students and engaging for the specialist reader, Rebecca Karl produces a compelling narrative of the political thought and actions of Mao Zedong that is deftly situated within the local and global historical conjunctures of the twentieth century. Attentive to the complexity of the historical and theoretical struggles in which Mao Zedong participated, the book smoothly transitions from accounts of military encounters and strategy, revolutionary Marxist theory, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) power struggles, details of Mao’s personal life, and critical insights into the historiography on Mao Zedong and twentieth century Chinese history. The result is an informative work that refuses simplistic or sensationalist understandings of the People’s Republic of China; a work that instead insists that the reader take seriously the ideological positions and social goals – and their failures – that animated Mao Zedong. The book is a welcome addition to existing biographies and intellectual histories of Mao Zedong. First, it is characterized by sustained attention to feminism and women’s liberation, alongside world historical developments. Second, even while Mao Zedong occupies centre stage in her narrative and analysis, Karl never insinuates that Mao Zedong orchestrated a revolution on the people of China as per ‘great man’ approaches to history that locate power in a leader and presume acquiescence by the people. Whether [End Page 446] discussing regional differences in peasant participation in land reform or the appeal of the Cultural Revolution outside China, Karl incorporates a discussion of why and in what manner individuals participated in the various mass campaigns of the era. The concise nature of the book precludes Karl from providing detailed information about the motives of specific social groups, but she constantly reminds us that people made decisions to participate in politics and that their actions were part of a broader process of producing and enacting consciousness through political participation. For example, with respect to the Cultural Revolution and dominant interpretations of this tumultuous and disastrous period in Chinese history, Karl addresses the claim that the Cultural Revolution is evidence of the blind obedience of Chinese who lack a tradition of independence and freedom. Karl acknowledges that the magnitude of participation in the Cultural Revolution is one of its defining characteristics yet, contra the above interpretation, she suggests that mass participation in attacks on the CCP reflect people’s decisions to act against the Party for not producing the type of society desired (p. 118). The attention to agency, history, and politics is personalized in interview interludes with: Wang Yanghua, one of the last living members of the Shanghai Underground Communist Party in the 1940s; Sabu Kohso, Japanese-born New York-based independent writer who encountered Maoism while in high school in Japan in the 1970s; and Wang Hui, leading literary and historical scholar in China and critic of Dengist reform. The interviews provide insight into how Mao’s ideas and practices shaped critical engagement with the politics of China (past and present). They remind the reader that the meaning and practice of the Chinese revolution was and is contested in the everyday. As such, the interviews also reinforce one of the themes of the book: “Practicing politics, in Mao’s terms, is part of everyday life” (pp. 57–8). As Karl elucidates, Mao Zedong continuously highlighted the interconnected complexity of each moment of struggle. As such, fascism, imperialism, local situations, and so on were all part of the revolutionary struggle. This makes for compelling theorizing, but often for disjointed or convoluted narratives. Yet, Karl successfully leads the reader through the labyrinth of overlapping and intertwined networks that defined and made the Chinese Revolution, including: CCP-PLA relations; Sino-Soviet relations; an emerging Third Worldism; debates within the CCP over the relative positioning of development and revolution; women’s liberation and feminism; personal relationships. The well-written and wide-ranging sub-sections...

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Acknowledgement This research was successively supported by an Overseas Research Student Award of the UK and National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) (No. 51008137). Notes 1. Mao Tse-tung, 'Some Experiences in Our Party's History (September 25, 1956)', in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. 5 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961). 2. Jack C. Westoby, '''Making Green the Motherland'': Forestry in China', in China's Road to Development, Neville Maxwell, ed. (Oxford: Pergamon, 1979), pp. 231–245. 3. Zhao Jijun 赵纪军, 'Sixty Years of Landscape Policies and Development in China (3): Making Green the Motherland' 新中国园林政策与建设 60年回眸(三)—绿化祖国. Landscape Architecture, 3, 2009, pp. 91–95. 4. The Mao era was considered in this study as from 1949 to 1978 despite Mao's death in 1976, since Hua Guofeng (1921–2008) who succeed as the chairman continued Mao's political orientation and policies by claiming that 'to support whatever policy decisions were made by Chairman Mao' and 'unswervingly follow whatever instructions were given by Chairman Mao'. A clear diversion of the policy was only made from the end of 1978 when the Reform and Opening-up Policy was initiated under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997). 5. For example, it was noted that foreigners visiting China during the Mao era were always subjected to tightly controlled itineraries to pilot projects, according to an interview with Professor Wang Shaozeng, currently editor of Chinese Landscape Architecture, 12 June 2009. This was also mentioned in: Anne-Marie Broudehoux, The Making and Selling of Post-Mao Beijing (London, New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 30–32. 6. The Third Internal Revolutionary War, commonly known as the War of Liberation (1945–1949), was fought between the Chinese Nationalist Party and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The latter led by Mao Zedong defeated the former in mainland China where the founding of the People's Republic of China was announced on 1 October 1949 on Tiananmen, Beijing. 7. Joseph W. Esherick, Remaking the Chinese City: Modernity and National Identity, 1900–1950 (Honolulu: University of Hawai' Press, 2000), p. 1. 8. Lu Duanfang, Remaking Chinese Urban Form: Modernity, Scarcity and Space, 1949–2005 (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2006), p. 6. 9. 'National Landscaping and Gardening Movement' is a translation of 'Dadi yuanlin hua' in Editorial Board of Chinese Agricultural Encyclopaedia, Gardening Volume 中国农业百科全书总编辑委员会观赏园艺卷编辑委员会,中国农业百科全书编辑部, ed. Chinese Agricultural Encyclopaedia, Gardening Volume 中国农业百科全书,观赏园艺卷 (Beijing: Agricultural Press, 1996), p. 58. 10. 'Speed up greening construction, advance afforestation quality' 加快绿化速度,提高造林质量. People's Daily (9 March 1959). Author's translation. 11. The phrase 'landscape profession' was used in this research for a better communication in the English context, as the latter equate for the Chinese to what is meant by the former in the West. 12. Mao Tse-tung, 'Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing (February 8, 1942)', in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. 3 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 63. 13. Keishu Saneto 实藤惠秀, A History of Chinese Studying in Japan 中国人留学日本史. trans. Tan Ruqian 谭汝谦, Lin Qiyan 林启彦 (Beijing: Sanlian Bookstore, 1956), p. 334. 14. Department of Landscape of Tokyo University of Agriculture 東京農業大学造園学科, 2nd ed. Landscape Dictionary 造園用語辞典 (Syokoku publication, 2002). 15. It is therefore not correct to consider that the Chinese term, lühua, might be a result of the translation of the corresponding Russian term in the 1950s, as some studies suggested. See: Lin Guangsi 林广思, 'Review and Prospect: A Study of the Landscape Architecture Education in China (1)' 回顾与展望—中国LA学科教育研讨 (1). Chinese Landscape Architecture, 9, 2005, pp. 1–8. 16. Zhang Guoqiang 张国强, 'How old is the word yuanlin?' '园林'一词有多早? Chinese Landscape Architecture, 6, 2007, p. 7. 17. Chen Zhi 陈植, Collected Works on Landscape Architecture of Chen Zhi 陈植造园文集 (Beijing: China Architecture and Building Press, 1988), pp. 175–181. 18. 'Towards National Landscaping and Gardening' 向大地园林化前进. People's Daily (27 March 1959); China Forestry Press. National Landscaping and Gardening (Vol. 1) 大地园林化(第一辑) (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1959), p. 1. 19. Wang Shaozeng 王绍增, 'Justification of name: re-discussion of Chinese translation of Landscape Architecture (LA)' 必也正名乎—再论LA的中译名. Chinese Landscape Architecture, 6, 1999, pp. 49–51. 20. Zhao Songqiao, Geography of China: Environment, Resources, Population, and Development (New York; Chichester: Wiley, 1994), p. 74. 21. Jack C. Westoby, '''Making Green the Motherland'': Forestry in China', in China's Road to Development, Neville Maxwell, ed. (Oxford: Pergamon, 1979), p. 236. 22. Sun Zhongshan 孙中山, 'Statement to Li Hongzhang (June, 1894)' 上李鸿章书(—八九四年六月), in The Complete Works of Sun Zhongshan. Vol. 1 (1890-1911) 孙中山 全集 (第一卷, 1890–1911) (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1981), pp. 8–18. 23. Traditionally, over 80% of the total population consisted of farmers, which has remained the case till the modern era. At the time of CCP's 1949 takeover, about 480 million of the total 540 million population were peasants. See Zhao Songqiao, Geography of China: Environment, Resources, Population, and Development (New York; Chichester: Wiley, 1994), p. 69; Tien H. Yuan, China's Population Struggle: Demographic Decisions of the People's Republic, 1949–1969 (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1973), p. 43. 24. National Programme for Agricultural Development 1956–1967 (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1960), p. 18. 25. China Forestry Press 中国林业出版社, Let Us Make Green the Four-Side 我们来绿化四旁 (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1958). 26. Interview with Professor Zhu Junzhen, one of the graduates in the early 1950s from China's first landscape architecture programme, 8 October 2005. She also mentioned stamp-like residential parks, which so appeared on plans of residential areas. This also indicated that greening would normally be done after the completion of building constructions. 27. 'Making Green the Motherland' 绿化祖国. People's Daily (17 February 1956). 28. Liu Chieh, 'Our country's forest wealth'. China Reconstructs, IV/8, August 1955, p. 18. 29. The Chinese text is '自己动手,丰衣足食'. Mao Tse-tung, 'Get Organized! (November 29, 1943)', in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. 3 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 154. 30. 'A new ''Great Wall'' of trees'. China Reconstructs, I/3, May-June 1952, pp. 42–44. 31. Publicity Department of the Forestry Ministry of the People's Republic of China 中华人民共和国林业部宣传科, Making Green the Motherland 绿化祖国 (Beijing: Chinese Society of Science and Technology Popularization, 1956), p. 14. 32. For example, Jia Yi (贾谊, 200–168 bc) in his article 'On the Faults of Qin (过秦论)' wrote, 'Sovereign and subject, firmly entrenched in defence, eyed the House of Zhou, with thoughts of rolling up the empire like a mat, enveloping all in the universe, pocketing everything within the four seas, and swallowing all in the eight directions'. (君臣固守以窥周室,有席卷天下,包举宇内,囊括四海之意,并吞八荒之心) Translated in http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/User:Yeu_Ninje/Sandbox. Accessed 24 July 2012. 33. The phrase was referred to in one of Mao's poems in 1963, which read 'The Four Seas are rising, clouds and waters raging. The Five Continents are rocking, wind and thunder roaring'. The Chinese sentences are '四海翻腾云水怒,五洲震荡风雷激'. Translated in Christopher L. Salter, 'In memoriam: selected landscape poetry of Mao Tse-Tung'. The China Geographer, No. 5, Fall, 1976, p. 62. 34. 'Man wins over ''fate'''. China Reconstructs, I/1, January-February 1952, p. 38. 35. Publicity Department of the Forestry Ministry of the People's Republic of China 中华人民共和国林业部宣传科, Making Green the Motherland 绿化祖国 (Beijing: Chinese Society of Science and Technology Popularization, 1956), p. 10. 36. Liu Chieh. 'Our country's forest wealth', China Reconstructs, IV/8, August 1955, pp. 18–21. 37. 'To accomplish ''hundred, thousand, ten thousand'', forestry cadres should try to outdo the others' 实现' 百千万' ,林业干部要争先, in Forestry Ministry of the People's Republic of China 中华人民共和国林业部, The High Tide of Making Green the Motherland (Vol. 1) 绿化祖国的高潮(第一辑) (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1958), pp. 9–11. 'mu' is a unit of area in China. One mu is equivalent to 1/15 hectare or 1/6 acre. 38. Liu Qingquan 刘清泉, 'From Four-Side Greening to Whole Land Greening' 由四旁绿化到全境绿化, in China Forestry Press 中国林业出版社, Let Us Make Green the Four-Side 我们来绿化四旁 (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1958), pp. 7–16. 39. Mao Tse-tung, 'On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People (February 27, 1957)', in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 5 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), p. 419. 40. The Eight-Character Principle is in Chinese '调整,巩固,充实,提高'. 41. Maurice Meisner, Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic (New York: Free Press, 1999), pp. 245–259. 42. Zhao Jijun and Jan Woudstra, 'In Agriculture, Learn from Dazhai' : Mao Zedong's Revolutionary Model Village and the Battle against Nature. Landscape Research, 32/2, April 2007, pp. 171–205. 43. Hua Linmao 华林茂, 'Striving for afforestation, Making Green the Motherland' 植树造林,绿化祖国. People's Daily (8 March 1972). 44. Edwin T. Morris, The Gardens of China: History, Art, and Meanings (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1983), p. 25. 45. The Forestry Ministry of the People's Republic of China 中华人民共和国林业部, A Collection of Statistics of Chinese Forestry (1949–1987) 全国林业统计资料汇编 (1949–1987) (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1990). 46. China Forestry Society 中国林学会, The Development of China's Forestry 中国森林的变迁 (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1997), p. 54. 47. Some articles during the Cultural Revolution referred to the vision of a 'sea', such as: 'A picturesque forest "sea" of Gaofeng Mountain' 高峰山林海如画. People's Daily (6 January 1973); 'A forest "sea" in Taihang Mountain' 太行山上一林海. Hebei Daily (2 April 1973). 48. There was no reference to the 'Great Wall' in publications about afforestation during the Cultural Revolution, such as: Hua Linmao 华林茂, 'Striving for afforestation, Making Green the Motherland' 植树造林,绿化祖国. People's Daily (8 March 1972); Forestry Department of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry of the People's Republic of China 中华人民共和国农林部林业组, Making Green the Motherland (Vol. 5) 绿化祖国(第五集) (Beijing: Agricultural Press, 1973); Forestry Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 农林部林业局, Making Green the Motherland (Vol. 7) 绿化祖国(第七集) (Beijing: Agricultural Press, 1974); Forestry Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 农林部林业局, Making Green the Motherland (Vol. 9) 绿化祖国(第九集) (Beijing: Agricultural Press, 1976). 49. Department of Resources and Forest Management of the Forestry Ministry 林业部资源和林政管理司, Survey of Contemporary Chinese Forest Resources (1949–1993) 当代中国森林资源概况 (1949–1993) (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1996), p. 3; Editorial Board of Forest of China 《中国森林》编辑委员会, Forest of China (Vol. 1) 中国森林 (第1卷) (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1997), p. 206. 50. Interview with Professor Wang Shaozeng, 12 June 2009. 51. Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局, A Collection of Working Experiences in Beijing Landscape Architecture (1949–1959) 北京市园林工作经验汇编 (1949–1959) (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1960), p. 2. 52. Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局, A History of Beijing Modern Landscape Architecture 当代北京园林发展史 (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1987), p. 224. 53. The orchards included 571 mu (c. 38 hectares) vineyards, 1280 mu (c. 85 hectares) apple, 529 mu (c. 35 hectares) pear, 185 mu (c. 12 hectares) peach, and 100 mu (c. 7 hectares) apricot. See: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局, Annual Report of Beijing Landscape Architecture (1961–1962) 北京市园林绿化工作年报 (1961–1962) (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1963), p. 1. 54. Sun Boxun 孙伯勋, 'Management of the vineyards of Dongzhi Road in 1961' 东直路 1961 年葡萄管理情况介绍, in Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局, Annual Report of Beijing Landscape Architecture (1961–1962) 北京市园林绿化工作年报 (1961–1962) (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1963), pp. 114–115. 55. The Chinese text is '以农业为基础,大办粮食'. See Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局, Annual Report of Beijing Landscape Architecture (1960) 北京市园林绿化工作年报 (1960) (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1961), p. 4. 56. Editorial Board of Joyous Pavilion Park Records 陶然亭公园志编纂委员会, Joyous Pavilion Park Records 陶然亭公园志 (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1999), p. 31. 57. The 'ten-side land' means the small plots of lands by the side of fields, trenches, roads, channels, graves, houses, walls, woods, barren banks, and ponds. The Chinese text is '地边、渠边、道边、沟边、坟边、房边、墙边、树林边、荒滩边、水坑边'. 58. Editorial Board of Historical Records of the Construction of Beijing 北京建设史书编辑委员会, The Construction of Beijing from the Founding of the People's Republic of China 建国以来的北京城市建设. Restricted publication (1986), p. 353. 59. Editorial Board of Joyous Pavilion Park Records 陶然亭公园志编纂委员会, Joyous Pavilion Park Records 陶然亭公园志 (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1999), p. 31. 60. Quoted from Hangzhou Park Management Bureau 杭州市园林管理局. 'It is good to combine gardens with production, and the West Lake takes on a new look' 园林结合生产好,西湖风景面貌新. Architectural Journal, 1, 1976, p. 44. Author's translation. 61. The name of 'May Seventh Farm' was derived from the 'May Seventh' rural cadre school, which was first established on 7 May 1968 for officials and 'brain workers' to regularly participate in productive labour as a process of 'ideological revolutionization'. 62. 'A brief history of the construction of Zhongshan Park, Shantou' 汕头中山公园建设史略, available at http://stcg.shantou.gov.cn/stgk4-b.htm. Accessed 22 December 2006. 63. Among the misappropriations, an area of 5028 square metres was occupied by the Real Estate Management Bureau of Xuanwu District in 1966 for establishing a residential area; 218 square metres by Beijing Qianxiang Leather Shoes Factory in April 1967; and 900 square metres by Beijing Tannery in April 1970. See Editorial Board of Joyous Pavilion Park Records 陶然亭公园志编纂委员会, Joyous Pavilion Park Records 陶然亭公园志 (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1999), pp. 34–35. 64. Editorial Board of Shanghai Landscape Architecture Records 《上海园林志》编纂委员会, Shanghai Landscape Architecture Records上海园林志 (Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press, 2000), p. 377. 65. Lin Xiaoxia 林晓侠, 'Why are factories built in parks?' 工厂为什么办到公园里去了?People's Daily (9 June 1978). 66. It turned out as a result of Western influences from the mid-nineteenth century. For example, in view of the contemporary defeat by Western imperialist powers, Zeng Guofan (1811–1872), one of the initiators of the Westernization Movement (1861–1894), once recorded that 'each committee member examines in detail the machine illustrations, and with the laws of point, line, plane and volume, pursue the functionality of square, circle, the horizontal and the vertical' (各委员详考图说,以点线面体之法,求方圆平直之用), in order to produce vessel and cannon fighting against imperialists. See: Zeng Guofan, The Complete Works of Zeng Guofan 曾文正公全集 (Taibei: Taiwan Eastern Bookstore, 1964). 67. Liu Shanghua 柳尚华, Fifty Years of Chinese Landscape Architecture: 1949–1999 中国风景园林当代五十年:1949–1999 (Beijing: China Architecture and Building Press, 1999), p. 23. 68. Leonid Borisovich Lunts, Greening Construction 绿化建设, trans. Zhu Junzhen 朱钧珍, Liu Chengxian 刘承娴, Ma Shiwei 马士伟, and Shen Dalun 沈大纶 (Beijing: Architectural Engineering Press, 1956), p. 222. These guidelines were consistently followed in the only Chinese handbook on residential greening, published in the late 1950s. See: Research Unit of Regional and City Planning of Architectural Science Research Institute 建筑科学研究院区域规划与城市规划研究室. Neighbourhood Greening 街坊绿化 (Beijing: Architectural Engineering Press, 1959), p. 7. 69. Quoted from Liu Shanghua 柳尚华, Fifty Years of Chinese Landscape Architecture: 1949–1999 中国风景园林当代五十年:1949–1999 (Beijing: China Architecture and Building Press, 1999), pp. 4, 19. Author's translation. 70. Interview with Professor Lü Junhua of Tsinghua University, 17 January 2005. 71. Chen Youmin 陈有民. 'Celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of garden making group (gardening discipline)' 纪念造园组(园林专业)创建五十周年. Chinese Landscape Architecture, 1, 2002, pp, 4–5. Leningrad Forestry Academy is now St Petersburg State Forest-Technical Academy. 72. The Chinese text is '普遍绿化,重点提高'. Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局. A Collection of Working Experiences in Beijing Landscape Architecture (1949–1959) 北京市园林工作经验汇编 (1949–1959) (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1960), p. 5. 73. The Chinese text is '先绿化,后美化'. Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局. A Collection of Working Experiences in Beijing Landscape Architecture (1949–1959) 北京市园林工作经验汇编 (1949–1959) (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1960), p. 87. 74. Research Unit of Regional and City Planning of Architectural Science Research Institute 建筑科学研究院区域规划与城市规划研究室, Neighbourhood Greening 街坊绿化 (Beijing: Architectural Engineering Press, 1959), p. 9. 75. Editorial Board of Shanghai Housing Construction Records 《上海住宅建设志》编纂委员会, Shanghai Housing Construction Records 上海住宅建设志 (Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press, 1998), p. 280. 76. Other street names included Chinese Flowering Crab-apple Riverside Road (棠浦路), Plum Hill Road (梅岭路), Maple Bridge Road (枫桥路), Flower Brook Road (花溪路), Orchid Brook Road (兰溪路), Plum River Road (梅川路), Jujube Spring Road (枣阳路), and Apricot Hill Road (杏山路). It was common that limited provision of trees resulted in a lack of planting diversity at the time. As a result, this naming approach was so important for the envisioned comprehensiveness that some people in Beijing complained for such scarcity that, 'There was no road with a name associated with trees, such as Bodhi Avenue'. See: Liu Zhonghua 刘仲华, 'Oppose Right deviation, go all out, achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results in making green the capital' 反右倾,鼓干劲,多快好省绿化首都, in Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局. A Collection of the Working Experiences in Beijing Landscape Architecture (1949–1959) 北京市园林工作经验汇编 (1949–1959) (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1960), p. 1. 77. Editorial Board of Shanghai Housing Construction Records 《上海住宅建设志》编纂委员会, Shanghai Housing Construction Records 上海住宅建设志 (Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press, 1998), p. 279. 78. Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局, A Collection of Working Experiences in Beijing Landscape Architecture (1949–1959) 北京市园林工作经验汇编 (1949–1959) (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1960), p. 211. 79. This could be read in the figure of increment of numbers of Chinese public parks in: Li Min 李敏, Modern Parks in China: Development and Evaluation 中国现代公园-发展与评价 (Beijing: Beijing Science and Technology Press, 1987), p. 22. 80. Su Zemin 苏则民, 'Investigations into the experience in Tiananmen Square's reconstruction and planning' 天安门广场改建和规划的经验探讨 (unpublished Master of Architecture Thesis, School of Architecture, Tsinghua University, 1965), p. 1. 81. Imperialism, feudalism and capitalism were claimed as the 'Three Big Mountains', which weighed on the backs of the Chinese people in the 'old society' before the 1949 Liberation. 82. Wu Liangyong 吴良镛, 'The design achievements of the Monument to the People's Heroes' 人民英雄纪念碑的创作成就. Architectural Journal, 2, 1978, p. 4; Dong Guangqi 董光器, 'Some records of Tiananmen Square' 天安门广场纪事, in Fifty Years' Retrospection: Urban Planning of the New China 五十年回眸-新中国的城市规划, Urban Planning Society of China, ed. (Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1999), p. 514. 83. In the speech delivered by Premier Zhou Enlai in the founding ceremony of the Monument to the People's Heroes on 30 September 1949. See: Wu Liangyong 吴良镛, 'The planning and design of Tiananmen Square' 天安门广场的规划和设计. Collected Essays in Architectural History, 2, 1979, p. 19. 84. Li Jiale 李嘉乐, 'The greening of Tiananmen Square' 天安门广场的绿化, in Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局. A Collection of the Working Experiences in Beijing Landscape Architecture (1949–1959) 北京市园林工作经验汇编 (1949–1959) (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1960), p. 21. 85. Wu Liangyong 吴良镛, 'The Planning and Design of the Tiananmen Square' 天安门广场的规划和设计. Collected Essays on Architectural History, 2, 1979, p. 31. 86. Fan Yaobang 范耀邦, 'Suggestions for reasonable density of residential areas' 关于居住区合理密度的几点意见. Architectural Journal, 3, 1980, p. 22. 87. Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局, 'Greening for Chairman Mao's mausoleum' 毛主席纪念堂的绿化工程. Building Technology, Z1, 1978, p. 113. 88. Quoted from Red Flag of Faculty of South China College of Technology 华南工学院教工红旗 ed. A Collection of Criticisms of the Crimes of Tao Zhu in the Architectural Profession 陶铸在建筑领域的罪行批判集 (Guangzhou: South China College of Technology, 1967), p. 2. Author's translation. 89. Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局, A History of Beijing Modern Landscape Architecture 当代北京园林发展史 (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1987), p. 44. 90. This was announced in the Member of the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's Congress. 91. Liu Shanghua 柳尚华, Fifty Years of Chinese Landscape Architecture: 1949–1999 中国风景园林当代五十年:1949–1999 (Beijing: China Architecture and Building Press, 1999), p. 72. 92. 'Every one should plant three to five trees annually' 每人每年种三至五棵树. People's Daily (16 December 1981). 93. Interview with Professor Wang Shaozeng, 20 November 2010.

Research Article| November 01 1977 China after Mao Allen S. Whiting Allen S. Whiting Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Far Eastern Survey (1948) 17 (11): 1028–1035. https://doi.org/10.2307/2643351 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Allen S. Whiting; China after Mao. Far Eastern Survey 2 June 1948; 17 (11): 1028–1035. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2643351 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1979 Regents of the University of California Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

“In my entire life I did not produce a single painting that was uppermost in mind to create,” the celebrated painter Dong Xiwen (1914–1973) reportedly lamented on his deathbed. Dong may not have produced the dream piece that he would truly cherish, but he did create, albeit unwillingly, a deeply controversial work of art in his 1953 oil painting The Founding Ceremony of the Nation (Kaiguo dadian) (Figures 1 and 2), for it epitomizes the tension between art and politics in the People's Republic of China (PRC). In this famous piece, Dong portrays Chairman Mao Zedong (1893–1976) in Tiananmen Square on 1 October 1949, with his senior associates in attendance—Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969), Zhu De (1886–1976), Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), Gao Gang (1905–1954), Lin Boqu (1886–1960), and others. They are surrounded by huge lanterns, a Chinese symbol of prosperity, and a sea of red banners that declare the founding of a new nation. When first unveiled in 1953, the painting was widely hailed as one of the greatest oil paintings ever produced by a native artist. In just three months more than half-a-million reproductions of the painting were sold. But the fate of this work soon took an ominous turn, and the artist was requested to make three major revisions during his lifetime. In 1954 Dong was instructed to excise Gao Gang from the scene when Gao was purged by the Party for allegedly plotting to seize power and create an “independent kingdom” in Manchuria. During the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1960s Liu Shaoqi was accused of advocating a “bourgeois reactionary line” and subsequently was purged, and Dong was ordered in 1967 to redo his painting again and erased Liu from the inauguration scene. Then, in 1972, also during the Cultural Revolution, the radicals, commonly labeled the “Gang of Four,” ordered a third revision, namely, that Lin Boqu be eliminated from the painting for allegedly opposing the marriage of Mao and Jiang Qing (1914–1991) during the Yan'an days. By this time Dong was dying of cancer and was too ill to pick up the brush, so his student Jin Shangyi (b. 1934), and another artist, Zhao Yu (1926–1980), were assigned the task. These two artists, afraid of doing further damage to the original piece, eventually produced a replica of the painting, with the ailing Dong brought from the hospital for consultation on his embattled work. Though Dong died the following year, the ill-fated story of The Founding Ceremony of the Nation did not end: in 1979, with the demise of the Gang of Four and the Party's official rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi, the images of Liu, Gao Gang, and Lin Boqu were restored in the painting. Because Jin Shangyi was on a foreign tour, Yan Zhenduo (b. 1940), a graduate of the Department of Oil Painting at the Central Academy of Fine Arts (CAFA), was called upon to help reinstall the three leaders.

Throughout the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), disagreement has existed concerning the extent to which Chinese Communism might be considered authentically Marxist. In general, most of the available literature tends to simply accept the Chinese Communist self-identification as Marxist. No binding consensus among independent Sinologists, however, is found and resistance has taken on a variety of forms throughout the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—some partisan and some genuinely analytic. The academic literature produced during the entire period of CCP rule in China has been characterized by wide differences in the acceptance of its Marxist authenticity. It has always been tacitly or explicitly accepted that the Marxism of the CCP at its founding in 1920–1921 was in a form acceptable to the Bolshevik rulers of revolutionary Russia. Having been founded directly through the influence of the Third (or Leninist) International, the CCP had to conform to the Bolshevik interpretation of Marxism. Since Lenin had taken “creative” liberties with the original doctrine, some have maintained that the Marxism of the CCP had never been truly Marxist. To add further difficulty to any analysis of the Marxism of the CCP, it is generally understood that Mao Zedong, who gradually assumed the leadership of the CCP, was not particularly well versed in any variant of Marxism. Over the years and under the pressure of circumstances, Mao delivered varied formulations of his revolutionary ideology. How much those formulations accorded with any variant of Marxism became a matter of interpretation. Some scholars hold that by the time of the “Great Leap Forward,” Mao had devised his own ideology. All of this speculation generated controversy within the CCP leadership. By the time of Mao’s demise in 1976, the doctrine of a “second revolution” animated Deng Xiaoping and his followers. It is still a matter of considerable controversy whether that post-Maoist doctrine, in any sense, is Marxist in content or aspiration.

Reviewed by: Staging Chinese Revolution: Theater, Film, and the Afterlives of Propaganda by Xiaomei Chen Rosemary Roberts Staging Chinese Revolution: Theater, Film, and the Afterlives of Propaganda by Xiaomei Chen. New York: Columbia University Press, 2016, Pp. xiv + 363. $60.00 cloth, $59.99 e-book. Xiaomei Chen begins Staging Chinese Revolution with an acknowledgments section that reveals her distinctive positioning as author in relation to her subject matter. Very much in the manner of Ruru Li’s excellent study of Beijing opera performance in modern China, Xiaomei Chen’s book combines the intimate subjective understanding of the insider with the objective and critical eye of the outsider.1 Chen’s acknowledgments, along with personal recollections scattered through the book, locate a crucial part of her own life experience as part of the “big family” of the China Youth Art Theater in Beijing during the 1950s and 1960s, when it was performing many of the “red classic” (hongse jingdian 红色经典) plays under discussion in Chen’s book. This intimate personal knowledge of China’s theater world informs Chen’s central argument: political propaganda in Chinese theater and film has never been just a task imposed from the top down; rather, it has been a complex and fundamentally willing collaboration between Chinese Communist Party (CCP) elites and a performing arts community that was ideologically committed to communist ideals and a socialist society. Playwrights, directors, and performers were not and are not hapless victims of the regime. Instead, they are active participants in the creation of political propaganda that functions through changing political and social environments to support the Party-state. To substantiate her argument, Chen investigates the most extreme forms of communist theater and film propaganda of the post-1949 era: historical narratives of Party leaders and revolutionary music-and-dance epics. Representations of former Party leaders Chen Duxiu 陈独秀, Mao Zedong 毛泽东, and Deng Xiaoping 邓小平 each form the central focus of a single chapter, while a separate chapter discusses the [End Page 204] three major music-and-dance epics, The East Is Red (Dongfang hong 东方红, 1964), The Song of the Chinese Revolution (Zhongguo geming zhi ge 中国革命之歌, 1984), and The Road to Revival (Fuxing zhi lu 复兴之路, 2009). An epilogue briefly considers how the representation of the revolution’s “founding mothers” has dwindled to traditionally gendered “supporting roles” (p. 287). Chen’s introductory chapter begins by locating her research within contemporary propaganda studies and then previews the core chapters listed above. Its most valuable contribution, however, lies in the second half of the chapter, which delves into the contemporaneous beginnings of the CCP and modern Chinese theater during the 1920s to demonstrate that close ideological and often personal links have existed between the two since their inception. Through an analysis of the work of the three “founding fathers” of modern Chinese theater, Tian Han 田汉, Hong Shen 洪深, and Ouyang Yuqian 歐阳玉倩, Chen argues: Tian and his cohorts visualized and staged a socialist blueprint in the leftist literary and dramatic tradition of the Republican period that paved the way for the construction of a socialist canon through his early writings during the first decades of the twentieth century, the war years, and the early years before and after the founding days of the PRC. (p. 30) Further, Chen argues that these three founding fathers trained generations of theater artists in the realist tradition. Their students have, in turn, gone on to participate in the creation of modern and contemporary canons, continually producing theater, film, and TV productions on revolutionary histories and the CCP leadership. Examples of the links between the early generations of Party elites and the theater world are well known. Mao trusted Tian Han to recommend which of two thousand submissions should be chosen as the design for the new national flag, and Zhou Enlai 周恩来 supported the use of Tian’s lyrics for the new national anthem (p. 31). Zhou Enlai himself is also known to have performed in progressive plays as a university student during the May Fourth period, and he personally over-saw the production of The East Is Red in 1964. In an era when theater was the primary vehicle available for spreading the socialist message— a message to which both theater professionals...

Reviewed by: China's Reforms and Reformers Yu Shen (bio) Alfred K. Ho. China's Reforms and Reformers. Westport (CT) and London: Praeger, 2004. x, 174 pp. Hardcover $79.95, ISBN 0-275-96080-3. The title of Alfred K. Ho's new book, China's Reforms and Reformers, did not prepare this reviewer for either the book's scope or its focus. I began reading with the assumption that it was about reforms that took place since the 1980s. I soon found out how wrong I was. Instead, Ho undertakes an expansive, though perfunctory, look at the almost century-long history of the Chinese Communist Party and identifies "reformers" among the top Communist veterans, including Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. According to Ho, from 1920 on these Communist leaders have waged continuous struggle against political tyranny, ideological fundamentalism, social injustice, and economic inequality. Ho is straightforward in expressing his admiration for the Communist leaders he calls "reformers" and views their struggles against the warlords and Nationalists as well as the fundamentalists within the Party as "reforms." Thanks to their "utmost determination, devotion, and courage," these reformers have turned China into a country that is "militarily prepared, economically prosperous, politically stable, and secure in foreign relations" (pp. ix-x). In his one-page introduction, he describes his intention to add a "human touch" to these men and women. Based on Chinese sources, he believes that this book is a "first" in the West. With such a claim of originality, Ho disappointed this reviewer greatly by not living up to what he had promised. The first two chapters, fifty pages in length, or almost a third of the book, cover a history that spans the period from 1920 to 1949. Chapter 1 focuses on the Revolution, divided between the early period, when Zhou Enlai was in control, until the failed military operation against the Nationalist Fifth Encirclement Campaign in 1934, and the later period, when Mao assumed the Party's leadership, which he would maintain until his death. Following a chronological approach, Ho tries to weave the personal stories of Zhou and Mao into a rather tedious general account of historical development in China. For example, when Zhou finished his studies abroad and returned to China in 1917, he soon found himself involved in the May Fourth Movement of 1918. It was during one of the protest demonstrations that he met his future wife Deng Yingchao (pp. 5-6). The reader would expect the author to contextualize Zhou's personal journey within the broad framework of Chinese history. Instead, Ho merely parallels Zhou's personal history with the nation's struggle, without offering much exploration of the connection between the two. Such a treatment is, unfortunately, standard throughout the book. Chapter 2 moves on to the war periods, which include the Sino-Japanese War from 1931 to 1945, the Civil War from 1946 to 1949, and the Korean War from 1950 [End Page 382] to 1953. With these wars as the background, Ho brings onto the scene several other Communist leaders whom he considers "reformers." We meet Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Lin Biao, and Liu Bocheng, and we learn about their family backgrounds and personal histories. However, we gain no insight into their individual and distinctive characters, nor do we know why they, each taking a different path, ended up joining the Communist cause. Chapter 3 focuses on the Mao years after 1949. While ambivalent about placing Mao among the reformers, the author does consider the achievements under Mao's leadership phenomenal. He also leaves Mao out of the factional Party struggle that evolved in the 1960s. The orthodox Marxists were led by Jiang Qing, Mao's wife; Lin Biao, the defense minister; and Kang Sheng, head of the secret service. The reformers were represented by Liu Shaoqi, vice president of the Central Committee, and Deng Xiaoping, the Party's general secretary. This struggle led to the Cultural Revolution. Ho sees it as an attempt by the orthodox Marxists to remove the reformers from their leadership positions. More names of victims of the Cultural Revolution are mentioned, people who are also considered reformers since they were targeted by the fundamentalists. By...

Reviewed by: Mao's Generals: Chen Yi and the New Fourth Army Peter O. Hefron (bio) Lanxin Xiang . Mao's Generals: Chen Yi and the New Fourth Army. Lanham, New York, and Oxford: University Press of America, 1998. xi, 223 pp. Hardcover $37.50, ISBN 0-7618-1129-x. Lanxin Xiang, Professor of International History at Geneva's Graduate Institute of International Studies, has written a well-researched work that is part biography of Chen Yi and part military history of the Chinese Communist Revolution. It traces Chen Yi's career from radical student to founder and commander of the New Fourth Army (NFA). It is also a military history of the NFA, dealing especially with its pivotal role in destroying the main power base of the Guomindang (GMD) in central and eastern China during the 1947-1949 period. One of the book's strengths is Xiang's use of his interviews with surviving members of the NFA as well as his utilization of newly published primary sources, mainly from the People's Republic of China (PRC). The history of the Eighth Route Army, created by the veterans of the Long March, is well known. Xiang provides us with an in-depth look at what happened to those scattered Chinese Communist Party (CCP) guerrilla units in Southeast China that the CCP Central Committee left behind at the start of the Long March. From these units and their commanders arose the New Fourth Army. He traces the evolution and unification of these units during their three years of isolation from Mao Zedong's Yan'an headquarters. Communications were reestablished in late 1937, parallel to the creation of the second CCP-GMD United Front. From the surviving thirteen thousand "Red Bandits," Mao in Yan'an, Chen Yi and his guerrilla cohorts in southern China, and the Guomindang fashioned the New Fourth Army from October to December 1937. Xiang gives a detailed analysis of the chief battles of the NFA as well as of the controversies between Mao and the NFA leadership over correct military and political strategy. The NFA soon became a microcosm for the factional rivalry between Mao's real and imagined enemies within the CCP, ranging from the pro Stalinist Comintern group to potential rightists among CCP military officers. The NFA ostensibly harbored both varieties. The NFA also served as the arena for strategic debates between Mao and the NFA's leadership, soon personified by Chen Yi and a number of his generals such as Su Yu, Ye Fei, and Huang Kechang. At issue were three matters: Should the CCP continue to rely on Mao's guerrilla warfare strategy or escalate permanently to conventional mobile warfare using regular CCP troop units? By 1947, mobile warfare was favored and successfully practiced by the NFA. To do otherwise, Chen felt, would extend the civil war by allowing the GMD to dominate the battlefield. [End Page 248] Should the NFA follow Mao's periodic desire to rebuild the CCP guerrilla bases south of the Yangzi River or follow Chen's strategy of taking the revolution to the GMD's strategic heartland north of the Yangzi River? Xiang discusses this seesaw debate in detail. Finally, should the CCP's chief goal for the second CCP-GMD United Front be to fight the Japanese invaders or to use it as cover for the CCP to expand its territory, troops, and population at the expense of the GMD? Unlike the other two issues, this latter debate was easily won by Mao. Soon most of the NFA leadership accepted Mao's view that the anti-Japanese war was secondary. CCP expansion, even at the risk of restarting the civil war, was necessary if Mao was to defeat the GMD government after the Western Allies defeated Japan. Xiang includes an analysis of Mao's pre-1949 purges of his CCP opponents, most notably the anti-Bolshevik purge of the early 1930s and the 1942 rectification of both Rightists and Cominternists. Mao's egocentric determination to become "China's Stalin" through periodic purges, regardless of their impact on the revolution, is a forerunner of post-1949 Maoist excesses. Inevitably these issues focus the author's attention on the credibility...

One of the most distinctive aspects of modern Chinese politics is the role of Tse-tung's This study investigates the concrete political and ideological process which gave rise to Mao's thought within the Chinese Communist Party, with special reference to the years 1935-45. This decade, which overlaps the Yenan period in Chinese Communist historiography, opens with Mao Tse-tung's rise to power at the Tsunyi Conference, and closes with the formal incorporation of his thought into the new CCP constitution at the Party's Seventh Congress. In the course of the study, it became apparent that Mao Tse-tung played a strong personal role in fostering the cult of his own person and thought. However, he received the enthusiastic support of a small group of Party intellectuals who gathered around him, of whom the most important is Ch'en Po-ta. Pending further research, conclusions regarding Ch'en's role must remain tentative, hut the initial evidence does suggest his influence on certain aspects of Mao's thinking, and in the formulation of a historio-philosophical rationale for Mao's claim to ideological supremacy. The study falls into two main periods; 1935-40 were years of ideological creativity, when the basic ideas behind Sinified were worked out by Mao and Ch'en; 1940-45 were years of ideological console idation, when the two men worked to systematize and disseminate Mao's thought as the CCP's official guiding doctrine. The conclusion emerges that the cult of Mao and his thought was not merely a simple concomitant of Mao's rise to power during this period. Rather, the dual cult was consciously created and propagated within and without the CCP as a deliberate act of policy on the part of the ascendant Maoists, with Mao and Ch'en very much at the core of this policy. From time to time, developments within the CCP, in Chinese domestic politics, and in the international arena intervened to accelerate or retard the Maoists' deliberate campaign to foster the ascendancy of Mao's thought. However, by the time of the CCP's Seventh Congress in 1945, the victorious Maoists had succeeded in their joint drive for the ''primitive accumulation of political and ideological power. Mao's power was by no means absolute, but the Chinese Communist Party -- and shortly the entire nation -- had entered the era of Tse-tung's In sum, this study contributes to our understanding of the Chinese Communist movement in four areas. It develops previous discussions of the ideological history of the CCP, especially regarding the emergence of the concepts of the Sinification of Marxism and Tse-tung's In using these ideological concepts as points of reference, this thesis also offers a distinctive approach to the study of elite politics within the CCP during the Yenan period. At the same time, Mao Tse-tung's personal role in fostering the twin cult of himself and his thought is brought into sharper focus than in previous studies. Finally, our knowledge of the early career of Ch'en Po-ta is considerably enhanced, particularly regarding his role as Party ideologist and historian in the service of Mao Tse-tung.

Zhou Enlai was born on March 5, 1898, in Huai'an, Jiangsu province (China). He became actively involved in the Chinese communist movement during his higher education in France and returned to China in 1924 as a senior communist leader. A leading figure of the Chinese Civil War (1927–50), he later escaped the purges of many officials by actively supporting Mao Zedong during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76). Having been the People's Republic of China (PRC)'s first foreign minister (1949–58) and premier (a post he kept until his death on January 8, 1976), Zhou Enlai played a central role in the formulation of the country's foreign policy doctrine (Peaceful Coexistence) and its come‐back to the international scene. He is credited for establishing relationships with interlocutors from both sides of the Iron Curtain and was the architect of the PRC's contemporary diplomatic principles.

Continuing the Reevaluation:Four Studies of the Cultural Revolution John A. Rapp (bio) Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals. Mao's Last Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006. xiii, 693 pp. Hardcover $35.00, ISBN 978-0-674-02332-1. Paperback $20.95, ISBN 978-0-674-02748-0. Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun. The End of the Maoist Era: Chinese Politics during the Twilight of the Cultural Revolution, 1972-1976. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2007. xxi, 705 pp. Hardcover $109.95, ISBN 978-0-7656-1096-6. Paperback $49.95, ISBN 978-0-076561097-3. Mobo Gao . The Battle for China's Past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution. London: Pluto Press, 2008. xi, 270 pp. Hardcover $90.00, ISBN 978-0-7453-2781-5. Paperback $27.95, ISBN 978-0-7453-2780-8. Paul Clark . The Chinese Cultural Revolution: A History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. xii, 352 pp. Hardcover $80.00, ISBN 978-0-521-87515-8. Paperback $22.99, ISBN 978-0-521-69786-6. Over forty years after the start of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China and over thirty years after its official end, Chinese and Western scholars are still arguing, not over the import of the movement—about which nearly everyone agrees is very great—but about its true nature and meaning. Was this cataclysmic event really a true revolution in Chinese culture and an attempt to preserve the socialist gains of the 1949 revolution against revisionists who would lead China back down the road toward capitalist inequality, as Maoists and their defenders in the West argue to varying degrees? Or, instead, was it really about a simple power struggle between Mao and his followers, on the one hand, and other ruling elites in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), on the other hand? Although of course there are many other possible views in between these two poles, at least three of the books under review come down clearly on one side or the other. MacFarquhar (a professor of history and government at Harvard) and Schoenhals (a professor of modern Chinese society at Lund University in Sweden) attempt, by far, the most comprehensive history of the period, based on their own previous extensive scholarship as well as on new Chinese-language materials made available during the 1980s and 1990s. Their book could well serve as a basic text in courses on the Cultural Revolution, with a caveat about their narrow, if justified, focus on elite politics. Their basic conclusion is that "the Cultural Revolution [End Page 160] was so great a disaster that it provoked an even more profound cultural revolution, precisely the one that Mao intended to forestall" (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 3) and that it was Mao Zedong himself who was primarily responsible for the Cultural Revolution. Using mostly an analysis of factional politics at the top of the Communist Chinese Party (CCP), the authors wholeheartedly accept what they recognize as the "common verdict" that without the Cultural Revolution there would have been no economic reform era. What they demonstrate quite persuasively more directly is that without Mao, there would have been no Cultural Revolution. Teiwes (an emeritus professor of Chinese politics, University of Sydney) and Sun (a senior lecturer in Chinese studies, Monash University) come to a very similar conclusion in their study of elite politics during the last half of the Cultural Revolution (the first installment of a projected three-volume work on the transition from "revolution through restoration toward reform" [Teiwes and Sun, p. xiv] that will cover the years from 1972-1982). Based on a review of many of the same sources of official and unofficial biographies and memoirs covered by MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, as well as on their own extensive personal interviews with Party historians and political figures involved in elite politics of the period, the authors conclude that even in the later years of the Cultural Revolution, from the fall of Defense Minister Lin Biao in 1971 to Mao's death in 1976 (when Mao was supposedly being challenged from other leaders and his health began to decline), in fact, Mao completely dominated elite politics almost to the very end of...