Abstract
We consider a set of agents who have claims on an endowment that is not large enough to cover all claims. Agents can form coalitions but a minimal coalition size θ is required to have positive coalitional funding that is proportional to the sum of the claims of its members. We analyze the structure of stable partitions when coalition members use well-behaved rules to allocate coalitional endowments, e.g., the well-known constrained equal awards rule (CEA) or the constrained equal losses rule (CEL). For continuous, (strictly) resource monotonic, and consistent rules, stable partitions with (mostly) θ-size coalitions emerge. For CEA and CEL we provide algorithms to construct such a stable partition formed by (mostly) θ-size coalitions.
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