Stability of nuclear forces versus weapons of mass destruction

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The model derived for nuclear missile exchanges is used to describe the interaction between two forces, of which one has nuclear weapons and the other has weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The model equations are solved analytically for exchanges, costs, and stability indices by analytically minimizing the cost of first strikes. The analysis is restricted to theater operations, as WMD are inferior to nuclear weapons in strategic counter force operations, but quite adequate for theater operations against exposed forces. The analysis treats only in-theater forces as companion papers show that ex-theater forces, which enter as survivable forces, cancel out of the theater balances treated here. Optimal nuclear weapon and WMD allocations are proportional to the opponent`s carriers and inversely proportional to one`s own weapons. Thus, as WMD increase, WMD allocations to nuclear forces fall, reflecting a shift from damage limiting to inflicting damage with surviving forces. Nuclear weapon kill probabilities degrade rapidly against dispersed forces. As they fall, their allocation to WMD falls sharply as they become ineffective and are reallocated to value. Thus, damage limiting is primarily effective for undispersed forces, which produces an incentive for the nuclear side to use his weapons while they are still effective.