Abstract
To deceive Inertial Navigation System(INS)/Global Navigation Satellite System(GNSS) integrated navigation terminals, the entry point is still to inject GNSS spoofing signals to the target system. However, the spoofing control strategy in integrated navigation mode for particular tasks such as fixed-point capture or directional drive needs further research. Whether applying GNSS spoofing attacks or not, the Kalman filter correction gain matrix element in the tightly coupled navigation system always maintains its stability, which gives us valuable clues to develop an effective spoofing attack. On this basis, this article focuses on the feasibility and operability of spoofing attacks under tightly coupled navigation conditions and innovatively proposes a spoofing control strategy that can achieve accurate position offsets: Specific spoofing signals are implanted to the target tightly coupled navigation terminal at the beginning of the spoofing attack. The amounts of pseudo-range spoofing signals corresponding to different satellites are respectively the projections of the position increments to be deceived on the sight vector of the integrated navigation terminal to each satellite. Simulation experiments and tightly coupled navigation terminal experiments verify the correctness and effectiveness of the spoofing control strategy.
Highlights
With the progress of science and technology and the rapid development of the economy, GNSS has been widely used in many fields of society [1], [2]
With the advantage of durability, maneuverability, and economy, the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) systems centered on the INS/GNSS integrated navigation system become an essential part of weapons and equipment in various countries [3]
Aiming at the task of accurately achieve the position offset of tightly integrated UAV systems in military operations, the third section of this paper combines the simulation experiments to verify the stability of the Kalman filter steady-state gain matrix elements in the tightly integrated navigation system, which lays the theoretical basis for implementing pseudo-range spoofing and achieving accurate position offset in this paper
Summary
With the progress of science and technology and the rapid development of the economy, GNSS has been widely used in many fields of society [1], [2]. Aiming at the task of accurately achieve the position offset of tightly integrated UAV systems in military operations, the third section of this paper combines the simulation experiments to verify the stability of the Kalman filter steady-state gain matrix elements in the tightly integrated navigation system, which lays the theoretical basis for implementing pseudo-range spoofing and achieving accurate position offset in this paper According to this characteristic of the steady-state gain matrix, the fourth section of this paper focuses on the feasibility and operability of spoofing attacks against tight coupled navigation and innovatively proposes a spoofing control strategy for a precise position offset against tight coupled unmanned systems: specific spoofing signals are implanted to the target tightly coupled navigation terminal at the beginning of the spoofing attack. By adding spoofing signals to Zk , we can directly inject GNSS spoofing attacks into the state filtering loop
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