Experimental Validation of INS Monitor against GNSS Spoofing

Abstract

Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) spoofing attacks are a critical threat to navigation integrity. We previously developed an analytical framework to evaluate the performance of Inertial Navigation System (INS) monitors against spoofing attacks, which is necessary for eventual clarification and certification of the INS monitor. In this paper, we develop and execute an experimental setup to verify the resistance of the monitor against worstcase GNSS spoofing attacks. The test setup includes generation of the worst-case spoofed code and carrier phase GPS signals (using a GNSS simulator) that feed the receiver through a cable without needing to broadcast via transmitter. Using these signals, the miss-detection rates of the Kalman filter innovations-based monitor, has been observed through a tightly-coupled integration of a tactical grade inertial and a standalone GNSS receiver on a static platform. The experimental evaluation technique in this paper is fundamental because it is the first hardware test to quantify spoofing resistance of a widely used IMU with worst-case spoofing signals. We realistically demonstrate that, even if the spoofer tracks the position of the receiver and filters the high-frequency tracking errors, the monitor is still capable of detecting that with low missed detection probability.